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1. Introduction: aims, scope and research question of this deliverable 
 
In line with the Grant Agreement, this deliverable is provided on month 22 (June 2018) and 
aims to develop a novel probabilistic model to classify EU citizens according to their level of 
identification with the EU. In order to achieve this objective, D2.4 addresses the following 
research questions:  
 
- To what extent do EU citizens identify with Europe and the EU project? 
- Have European regions different patterns and level of identification? 
- Are the results driven by specific socio-economic variables? 
 
These research questions play a key role in the development of the PERCEIVE project’s 
scientific results, embedding new challenges and opportunities in terms of methodological 
developments and policy implications at the EU level. On the one hand, D2.4 introduces an 
innovative conceptual and robust methodological solution to address the above-mentioned 
research questions, thus contributing to fill in a research gap.  D2.4 helps us to contextualize 
and to better understand the current political context of the EU, which is characterized by 
growing Euro-skepticism and citizens’ preference for populistic parties, as well as by 
citizens’ claims for democratization and transparency of the EU financial and economic 
decision making, at the light of EU citizens’ identification with the EU institutions.  
D2.4’s research is well integrated and builds on the outcomes of previous PERCEIVE’s 
work-packages activities, with the aim to exploit synergies and complementarities to deliver 
robust and policy-relevant results. In particular, D2.4 builds on the results of D1.1 (Regional 
case studies), on D1.2 (i.e. the PERCEIVE survey), D2.2. (determinants of citizens’ 
identification with the EU and impact of the Cohesion Policy), D2.3 (Composite Index of 
European Identity), D5.1 (definition and the determinants of European identity), D5.3 and 
D5.4, as from Table A.1 (in Appendix). Then, D2.4 provides inputs for D2.5 and for D6.2-d. 
The main outcome of D2.4 is the development of a novel probabilistic model - IdentEU - able 
to disentangle the patterns and drivers of EU citizens and regions’ identification with the EU 
project. To our knowledge, this is the first model ever developed to address this crucial 
research question for the future of the EU. We opted for a Hierarchical Latent Class analysis 
model to produce a map of the level of identification with the EU project across European 
regions, through the classification of citizens and regions in clusters (6 and 4 respectively) 
identified by the classes of a latent variable, accounting for heterogeneity across regions both 
in terms of intensity of identification and of forms that it takes. 
The results of the analysis developed in this report are supported by the development of the 
IdentEU probabilistic model and contribute to narrow the gap between academic research and 
policy making, in two ways. On the one hand, IdentEU contributes to fill a knowledge gap in 
terms of identification and understanding of the factors that influence citizens’ attitudes 
toward the EU, both at individual and regional level. This information is crucial for EU 
policy makers in a historical period characterized by growing EU citizens’ mistrust in the EU 
institutions, and growing Euro-skepticism, which eventually affected the recent electoral 
results in several EU member States (see Italy and France as most recent examples). 
On the other hand, IdentEU’s results contribute to foster a better knowledge of the factors 
characterizing EU citizens’ identification with the EU project. These elements provide 
policy-relevant and timely information to EU officers and policy-makers to improve the level 
of citizens’ identification in the EU project. This is particularly timely and relevant in the 
context of the current discussion on the proposal for the programming period of EU Cohesion 
Policy 2021-2027.  
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Indeed, in the last decade, the economic and political elements gained importance in 
understanding defining citizens’ EU identity and identification with the EU project. The 
negative effects of the last financial crisis on jobs and income accrued the effects of a 
mismanaged globalization process and eventually hit a large portion of EU population, 
increasing social and economic vulnerability for both low-income and middle-income 
households. The EU Cohesion Policy did not dispose of adequate financial endowments, nor 
was flexible enough to provide a buffer to the crisis and to move out of the crisis and identify 
opportunities for sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU. The worsening of the working 
and income conditions for a large share of EU households turned soon in social and political 
discontent. Therefore, although they are not explicitly considered in the model, in the 
conclusion we discuss the results obtained at the light of three phenomena that may have 
affected the citizens and regions’ level of identification with Europe and the EU project, i.e. 
i) the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, ii) the process of globalization, and iii) the political 
turmoil generated by the Brexit, in the future research development ahead. 
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the concepts and modelling approaches 
to measure EU citizens’ identification with the EU at the light of geo-political and economic 
drivers, by building on previous work in sociology, political sciences and economics. The 
interdisciplinary background of the concept and determinants of EU identity, developed in 
previous PERCEIVE’s work, represents our starting point to build the IdentEU model. 
Section 3 introduces the novel IdentEU probabilistic model to map EU citizens and regions’ 
identification with the EU project, building on a Latent Class (LC) analysis and multilevel 
modelling to develop a Hierarchical Latent Class (HLC) model (Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 
2002; Vermunt, 2003; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; Pirani, 2013) and presents the data 
used for the analysis, coming from the PERCEIVE Survey (see D1.2), and secondary data 
including socio-economic variables at regional level. ). Section 4 presents the results of the 
model at the individual and regional level. Section 5 concludes providing policy-
recommendations for the design of the EU Cohesion Policy framework 2021-2027. 
 
 
2. Operationalizing concepts and measures of European identity  
 
2.1 Defining European identity: from theory into modelling 
 
In this section, we recall the main ideas and knowledge developed by previous PERCEIVE 
research results that are propaedeutic to build the IdentEU probabilistic model, which we 
describe in Section 3. In particular, we review the concepts and determinants of individual 
and collective identification with the EU and with the European project discussed in D5.1 
(Barberio et al., 2017) and in D2.2 (Lopez-Bazo and Royuela, 2017) and used for the 
development of the Composite Index of European Identity in D2.3 (Royuela, 2018), 
identifying those functional to develop the probabilistic model IdentEU (see Section 3). In 
addition, we also identify and briefly discuss the socio-economic and political challenges that 
the EU has faced in the last decade and that should be considered in the discussion of the 
results of the probabilistic model IdentEU. The questions of why and to what extent EU 
citizens identify (or nor) with the EU institutions is gaining momentum due to the recent 
political developments in the EU, characterized by signals of “enlargement fatigue” and 
growing citizens’ skepticism towards its institutions (see for instance the case of Brexit) and 
the Euro. The last electoral results in Italy and France, where populist parties and anti-system 
movements obtained remarkable results, are signal of an expanding gap between EU citizens 
and EU institutions. These trends have been analysed at the light of recent economic and 
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financial events both inside and outside the EU border, e.g. the role of an ill-managed 
globalization, the impact of the last financial crisis on wealth concentration and inequality, 
the European institutions’ response to the Greek crisis, and from a governance point of view, 
highlighting the perceived lack of transparency in EU decision making in important areas of 
citizens’ life, and the lack of a cohesive EU response to migration. The EU Cohesion Policy 
and its implementation at the regional, national and supernational level have been mostly 
absent from the debate. Nevertheless, the results of previous PERCEIVE analyses (see the 
focus groups at the regional level D1.1 and the answers to the PERCEIVE survey in D1.2) 
show that a large share of EU citizens is aware of the role of the EU Cohesion Policy and EU 
funds on their socio-economic conditions. 
 
 
2.1.1 From individual to European identity  
 
The concepts of identity and identification with the EU have been analysed in the literature in 
terms of individual and collective European identity. 
The individual identity has been studied by Mendez and Batchler (2017) and Bergbauer 
(2018) at the light of the concept of social identity, defined as: “that part of the individual’s 
self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel 1981 
see also Tajfel and Turner, 1986). According to Bergbauer (2018), the individual 
identification with Europe can be explained as “citizens’ self-categorisation as European 
together with their evaluations of their membership in the European collective and their 
affective attachment to Europe and other Europeans” (Bergbauer, 2018). 
Three dimensions, i.e. a cognitive, affective and evaluative dimension, compose this 
subjective perception of identification (Bergbauer, 2018), where: 
 
- the cognitive component refers to self-categorization as a member of a group 
(Awareness);  
- the affective component refers to the emotional attachment and feeling of love and 
concern for the group, i.e. a “we-feeling” dimension (Attachment);  
- the evaluative component refers to the assignment of value connotation (negative or 
positive) to the social group and his membership, by comparing people from the group 
with people out of the group. Mendez and Batchler (2017) link this dimension to the civic 
and cultural/ethnic distinctions of EU identity (Evaluation). 
 
These dimensions have been also discussed in Royuela (2018) and used to inform the 
development of the Composite Index of European Identity. 
The collective identity considers the presence of a feeling of solidarity within a group driven 
idea that a group of individuals accepts a central similarity, based on religion, ethnicity, 
language, social class, gender, and of course, nations (Royuela, 2018).  
Bergbauer (2018) studies collective identity by building on concepts of social psychology, 
and on the sociological approach to collective identity. Social psychology considers the 
collective identity is “a situation in which individuals in a society identify with the collective 
and are aware that other members identify with this collective as well” (David and Bar-Tal, 
2009, p. 361). The awareness of individuals identifying with the group allows the possibility 
of collective mobilization. In contrast, the affective ties (i.e. the we-feeling), and the level of 
political cohesion and solidarity between the members of a community (i.e. the sense of 
community) characterise the sociological approach (Easton, 1965). However, the aspects 
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related to the share and intensity of citizens’ identification with Europe usually outpace those 
related to the level of awareness (Bergbauer, 2018). 
Finally, we have the European identity, which has been studied by two streams of academic 
research, according to Hooghe and Verhaegen (2017), i.e.:  
 
- The society based-approach, which assumes the identification of individuals with other 
European citizens and the trust towards other Europeans are respectively preconditions to 
the establishment of a European community, and to the legitimization of the process of 
European integration (Habermas, 2011;  Risse, 2014); 
- The functionalist institutional approach, which links the EU identification with the trust 
in the economic growth and prosperity and rights granted by European laws promoted by 
European institutions (Risse, 2010). This feeling has, in turn, both a cultural component 
referring to shared history, traditions and moral norms and values (Bruter, 2003), and a 
civic component, rooted on the rights and duties deriving from the EU Treaty (Reeskens 
and Hooghe, 2010). 
 
Barberio et al. (2017), in D5.1 of the PERCEIVE project, build on Political Science, Social 
Sciences and International Relations to discuss the concept of EU identity, highlighting the 
institutionalist, the social identity, the integration, the citizenship and the spatial 
conceptualization of the discourse. 
The institutional approach to the building of the EU identity emerged in the ‘60s of the last 
century and considered the introduction of a European identity as the final result of a process 
of European institutional building, which started with the European Economic Community 
and ended in the current form of the EU. It was expected that the benefits resulting from 
deeper cooperation among European member States would have increased trust in the 
European integration process, in line with the economic utilitarian theory (Gabel and Palmer, 
1995).  
Fligstein et al. (2012) link the cooperation approach and the integration approach, 
highlighting that the benefits of enhanced cooperation among European member States led to 
deeper integration. The different phases of EU integration contributed to the development of 
a nested structure of the concept of EU identity, starting from an initial economic integration 
phase to be followed by a political integration phase through spillovers, based on market 
mechanism (Haas, 1961). This process was expected to lead to a convergence of incomes, 
thanks to a period of long-lasting peace and cooperation in Europe, and through that to 
deliver co-operation, supranational rule-making and a convergence of beliefs, values and 
aspirations, generating a new European nationalism (Haas, 1968).  
Nevertheless, the expected advantages of further integration have been recently questioned, 
leading to the development of a region-based and nation-based idea of EU integration. 
Indeed, the EU has experienced a growing diffusion of regionalist and separatist movements 
(the last being the Catalonia independence referendum in 2017), and the regional/national 
rhetoric of several Euro-skeptic parties. This trend was associated to the development of a 
language of regionalism and the territorialisation of space used by nationalists and 
regionalists in constructing spatial oppositions with the central authorities. 
Then, in the late 1990s, the concept of social identities and the social construction idea 
emerged, contributing to shift the attention from rules and institutions to the social processes 
behind the construction of European integration and identification. According to Tajfel 
(1981), social identities are constructed in relation to, and in comparison with, other social 
identities, considering boundaries for inclusion and exclusion from the membership. 
Barberio et al. (2017) also highlight the linkage between the European identity and social 
identity in so far “they refer to a dimension of the individual’s self-concept shared with some 
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but not all other people” (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004; Citrin and Sides, 2004: 165). It 
emerges that social identities entail a locational and power dimension, where persons are 
associated with social expectations (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006). 
More recently, the formation of European identity has been discussed in relation to that of 
citizenship and national identities, from the point of view of the Europeanisation of national 
identities. On the one hand, the concept of European identity has been discussed in terms of 
its alignment with the concept of citizenship (in so far it considers the presence of 
membership within a political community) and thus it is pivotal for integration. This means 
that, the more citizens identify with the EU, the more they support it.  
On the other hand, EUROBAROMETER data showed that citizens who identify with their 
nation also have a basic sense of European identity (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Fligstein, 2008; 
Fligstein et al., 2012), with 43.3 percent of respondents viewing themselves as having 
primarily a national identity, but with European components. 
At this regard, Marcussen et al. (1999) identify three conditions for the incorporation of the 
European dimension in the national identity, i.e. i) the perception of legitimacy of the new 
political order (which has to share elements with the previous national political order), ii) the 
presence of critical junctures when old ideas are being challenged or contested, and iii) a 
negative correlation between the degree of consensus around national identities in a given 
society and the political elites’ space to shape it. In addition, Risse (2010) defines 
Europeaness as a basis of national identity according to constellations of relations where i) 
identities can be nested, ii) identities can be cross-cutting (i.e. some, but not all, members of 
one identity group are also members of another one), and iii) a blending of identities where 
nestedness and cross-cutting identities are combined. 
Finally, in a functional perspective, the discussion around the concept of EU identification 
questioned to what extent are EU institutions democratically legitimated (Habermas, 2011), 
analysing whether and how the EU institutions attempt to increase the democratic legitimacy 
of the multi-level political system (Holzhacker, 2007). This issue attracted more and more 
attention recently. Habermas (2012) discussed the issue of democratic legitimacy of EU 
institutions at the light of the management of the last financial crisis and of the Greek crisis, 
stating that in order for the European project to realize its democratic potential, it must evolve 
from an international into a cosmopolitan community, effectively extending the concept and 
implementation of democratic political institutions beyond the level of nation-states. Then, a 
discussion on the legitimacy of unelected institutions, i.e. the central banks, recently started 
(Tucker 2018). Indeed, central banks are unelected bodies but their power and influence on 
the economies increased considerably in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in 
particular with the introduction of unconventional monetary policies. 
The answers to the PERCEIVE survey (D1.2) show that the pattern of citizens’ identification 
with the idea of Europe is very heterogeneous across and within member states, and thus far 
from being complete. Indeed, it was highlighted that the sense of loyalty to the political 
system emerges from the perception of the same political system being an effective problem-
solving system (Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Harteveld et al., 2013).  
These suggestions deriving from the survey will be analysed through the hierarchical latent 
class model (section 3) and the results of which will be analysed in detail (section 4). 
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2.1.2 Determinants of EU identification 
 
The determinants of EU identity and individual identification have been discussed from a 
conceptual and an empirical point of view in Barberio et al. (2017), Lopez-Bazo and  
Royuela (2017), and Royuela (2018) and are operationalized in Royuela (2018). In Lopez-
Bazo and Royuela (2017), they allowed to build a theoretical framework of analysis to 
understand the drivers and patterns of citizens’ identification with the EU (using multivariate 
statistics and spatial analyses), while in Royuela  (2018) they have been used to develop a 
Composite Index of European Identity aimed to assess the determinants of European citizens’ 
identification with the European project (D2.3).  
Barberio et al. (2017) discuss four determinants of EU identity from a conceptual point of 
view. They discuss the components of identity at the light of the dichotomy civic vs. ethnic 
forms, the politicization of European identify, and the spatial component, including the rural-
urban divide.  
First, the distinction between the civic form of identity, which focuses on citizenship as a 
legal status conferred by acceptance of common institutions, laws, rules, political and social 
systems, and the ethnic/cultural component of European identity, which is defined by the 
feeling of commonality with others based on a shared history, language, values, ideals and 
religion and it is mostly understood to be acquired per birth, has been widely addressed in the 
literature (see recent contributions by Bruter 2003; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Risse, 
2010). This means that while some citizens might identify more with the political and legal 
elements of the EU, others might identify more with the cultural elements of Europe. Royuela 
(2018) define the civic/ethnic divide referring to the Eurobarometer questions related to the 
drivers of EU citizens’ feeling of community, in order to study whether a conflict exist 
between the two dimensions in relation to the EU identity. They use the answers to 
Eurobarometer’s questions to create two indicators, one referring to the civic and the other to 
the ethnic dimensions of EU identity. The indicators are then used in a model of EU identity. 
The parameters of their aggregate model show that civic values are positively associated with 
European identity, while ethnic values show heterogeneous results, with a negative 
association of the index at the individual level (Royuela, 2018).  
As regards the politicization of the European identity, the diffusion of Euro-skeptic and 
populist parties in the EU in the last 20 years (and in particular after the last EU Eastern 
enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2013) contributed to develop the metaphor of the “Fortress 
Europe” (see Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009), whereas the idea of identity is based more on a 
cultural, religious and ethnic-self component hostile to foreigners, immigrants and refugees. 
The spatial component plays a major role in the identification with the EU for at least two 
reasons (Paasi, 2001). On the one hand, in the last two decades, EU countries’ political and 
social boundaries were relaxed, with the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, 
Baltic and Western Balkan countries, and with the freedom to move and work in the EU 
granted by the Schengen treaty. On the other hand, the responsibilities of regions and 
regional authorities kept increasing in several EU member states, as a consequence of the 
process of devolution of central governments’ power, and the regionalization of the European 
Cohesion Policy. In addition, the access to the common EU market led to a globalization of 
production and consumption patterns, and to the loss of regional and local specificities (even 
in areas characterised by traditional productions, such as the industrial districts). In particular, 
the analysis of the drivers of the relation between urban and rural areas have shaped 
convergence studies in the last two decades.  
 
Lopez-Bazo and Royuela (2017) review the discourse on the determinants of EU 
identification at the individual and the system level, as discussed by Bergbauer (2018). The 
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individual level is characterized by political awareness, attitudes towards the European and 
national bodies, and personal transnational experiences. In contrast, the system level is 
influenced by party messages related to European and national community, the economic 
position and degree of international integration, and the ethnocultural identification (see 
Royuela, 2018). Then, based on the literature review, they provide a taxonomy of seven main 
determinants of identification with the EU, i.e.:  
 
- Political awareness, which considers the political interest and knowledge in general 
and EU matters, affecting the identification with Europe based on the information on 
the benefits (risks and downsides) of European integration. 
- Attitude towards the EU and national bodies, where the strength of national 
identification affects the level of identification with the EU, in a positive way if we 
accept the possibility of complementarity of identities, or in a negative way, if 
concerns on integrity and sovereignty drive to conflicting identities.  
- Personal traits and experience, where personal contacts with other EU citizens, 
including cross border trips or living together with intra-European immigrants, are 
expected to increase individual identification with Europe.  
- Party message related to the EU and national community, where the prevalence of 
pro-EU parties in a country lead to higher citizens’ exposure to messages signalling 
the benefits of the European integration (and viceversa, in the case of prevalence of 
Euro-skeptic countries). 
- National economic position and degree of international integration. This pertains 
citizens’ perceived benefits of belonging to the EU, and in particular, as analysed in 
other PERCEIVE research (e.g. D1.1, D1.2, D2.2, D5.1), in relation to the 
communication of the results of the Cohesion Policy at the national, regional and 
local level. 
- Ethnocultural identification, which can assume both a positive connotation, when 
citizens perceive that they gain experiences by interacting with other Europeans, and a 
negative connotation, when citizens perceive only the costs associated with further 
EU integration e.g. on changes in the labour market due to migration. 
- Trust in political institutions, at different levels, i.e. regional, national and European 
level. There is growing evidence that trust in institutions at the national level is 
positively correlated with trust in EU institutions (Hooghe and Verhaegen, 2017). 
 
From an empirical point of view, the identification with the idea of Europe has been 
represented by a wide list of determinants and translated into concrete indicators of the 
dimensions proposed by the theoretical approaches. In particular, Lopez-Bazo and  Royuela 
(2017) identify several individual control variables used in the literature, covering “age, 
gender, ethnicity, religion, education, occupation, the perceived situation of the economy and 
or society (e.g. perceived financial situation of the household) and even psychological traits, 
such as life satisfaction, partly (or even mostly) driven by external circumstances” (Lopez-
Bazo and Royuela, 2017). Main influencing variables are grouped into variables referring to: 
 
- Political capital, and including “cognitive mobilization, satisfaction with domestic 
democracy, perceived benefits from EU membership, and trust in institutions 
(although this variable is also considered as a proxy to identification with such 
institutions)” (Lopez-Bazo and Royuela, 2017) 
- Ideology, in particular referring to the political orientation and to the democratic 
satisfaction at the EU and country level. 
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- Socio-economic context, including control variables (e.g. GDP growth, inflation and 
unemployment, Verhaegen et al., 2014)); the rural - urban divide (Luhman, 2017); old 
versus new EU member states or years of EU membership. 
- Country level variables, including the corruption index, the scope of the welfare state 
and the economic benefit of belonging to the EU (e.g. the net contribution to EU 
budget, received structural funds, spread on sovereign bonds and intra EU export). In 
particular, the extent to which governments strategically allocate regional transfers to 
influence the public opinion has been analysed, also in relation to the effect of the EU 
structural funds on citizens’ attitude towards the EU (Osterloh, 2011). 
 
A specific discourse is then developed in Lopez-Bazo and Royuela (2017) and Royuela 
(2018) on the role of the EU Cohesion Policy on EU identification. Lopez-Bazo and Royuela 
(2017) discuss Osterloh’s results (2011), which highlight that EU Regional Policy affects 
citizens’ awareness and thus their support to the EU, but the level of awareness and support is 
conditioned to socio-economic characteristics, such as education. Levels of individual 
awareness are heterogeneous within every country, and relevant differences exist between 
regions in terms of education inequality (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios, 2009, 2010) and urban 
and rural divide (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios, 2011).   
The review of the discussion on the determinants of EU identification is propaedeutic for the 
development of the IdentEU probabilistic model described in Section 5. Indeed, the model 
integrates the three dimensions of “Awareness” (in terms of the EU Cohesion Policy and its 
local benefits, as well as their level of identification with Europe, country, region, and 
European values), “Evaluation” (in terms of perceived effectiveness of political institutions 
and benefits of EU membership) and “Attachment” (i.e. participation in the election and 
redistributive role of the EU). In addition, IdentEU considers: i) demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, introduced in the model as control variables and predictors (i.e. age, 
education, occupation status and the economic status, see table A.3 in appendix for a 
comprehensive description), ii) the spatial dimension, considered in the contextual covariates 
(e.g., the level of GDP per inhabitant in Euro at 2014 as percentage of EU average, the 
unemployment rate for people of 20-64 years old at 2014, the absorption rate of the Structural 
Fund financial allocation at 2013). 
 
 
3. The IdentEU probabilistic model 
 
3.1 Empirical model and strategy 
 
The analysis of the nature of what influences identity, and its implications in terms of 
attitudes towards integration and questions of behavior, have been mostly studied by political 
scientists with qualitative models (Meinhof and Galasinski, 2005; Grundy and Jamieson, 
2007; Bruter, 2004). Herrmann et al. (2004) and Bruter (2005, 2009) discussed how to move 
from qualitative to operative quantitative models, eventually identifying several challenges 
related to the measurement and characterization of identity. In particular, Bruter (2008) 
pointed out how in order to answer some major paradoxes, a more critical and rigorous 
measurement of European identity is needed. Bruter (2008) asserts that “most of the models 
that conclude to widespread Euroscepticism and minimal European identity rely on measures 
which truly capture neither”. Thus, imprecise or inaccurate measures of European identity 
coming from Eurobarometer’s Moreno questions can only lead to biased models. This 
explains the poor literature on quantitative modeling of EU identity, at the aggregate and 
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individual level. The first empirical model of EU identity, which relies on Herrmann et al. 
(2004) analysis of coexistence of multiple identities, was provided by Bruter (2009) who uses 
an experimental panel study design to test dynamic hypotheses, and finds a positive 
correlation between citizens’ European and national identities of the order of 0.19.   
With this deliverable, we contribute to enrich the infant literature on quantitative modelling 
of EU identity by developing the IdentEU probabilistic model. We opted for Latent Class 
Analysis (LCA) and multilevel modelling to develop a Hierarchical Latent Class (LC) model 
(Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; Vermunt, 2003; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).  
Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a powerful tool for the analysis of the association among 
categorically observed measures (indicators or manifest variables) with the aim of 
identifying a latent categorical variable accounting for the interrelationships and the 
associations between the observed indicators. The latent classes are the levels of this 
categorical latent variable, to which the respondents are allocated depending on the responses 
to the observed indicators. Hence, LCA can serve to investigate the unobserved heterogeneity 
among the respondents and to develop a probabilistic classification of respondents on the 
basis of their responses. 
Through LCA, we deal with identification of citizens with EU as latent construct. In our 
empirical application, the latent construct is derived from a  set of interrelated observed 
measures (described in the next section) whose associations are due to an unobserved factor 
treated as categorical: the latent classes represent the latent levels of identification. 
Despite being possible to consider identification as a latent continuous variable, assuming a 
discrete latent variable allows us to define different patterns of identification according to the 
different profiles of respondents, and to analyse their features.  
We start from a set of K categorical observed indicators
1
. The model identifies T classes of a 
latent variable that describes an unobservable construct (i.e. the identification with the EU) 
and provides a classification of individuals based on the response patterns to the K indicators.  
In doing so, it exploits the nested structure of the data, insofar the individuals (first-level 
units) are nested into regions (second-levels units). Our hierarchical model accounts for 
unobserved (latent) regional effects and considers them as a discrete latent variable with L 
classes according with the classification of identification at individual level.  
From a methodological point of view, we indicate the K responses referring to the concept of 
identification with the EU with 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘, each describing the response to item k of person i 
coming from region j. 
In particular:  𝒀𝑖𝑗 is the vector of responses of the same individual i, 𝒀𝑗  represents the vector 
of responses of all individuals in region j, 𝒁𝑖𝑗 is the vector of individual covariates, and 𝒁𝑗
𝑔
 is 
the vector of covariates at regional level. Then, we define as 𝑋𝑖𝑗 the first-level latent variable 
(unobservable) that represents identification with EU at individual level. 
Given their response patterns to the manifest indicators, individuals are classified in one of 
the T latent classes of 𝑋𝑖𝑗, t=1,…T, where each latent class is identified by the pattern of the 
K individual responses classified with the highest probability in that class (Standard LC 
Model). 
The random effects at regional level are specified as a discrete latent variable 𝑊𝑗  , 
conditionally on which the individual responses are assumed to be mutually independent. 𝑊𝑗 
identifies latent types of regions for which the parameters in the model differ. Thus, the 
second level latent variable allows to cluster the second level units (i.e. regions) into a small 
number of latent classes, m=1,…,M.  
                                                 
1
 A similar model is discussed   in Pirani (2013) and used to investigate the patterns of social exclusion in the 
European regions. In describing the model, we follow Pirani and the notation used there. 
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LC models are based on the assumption of “local independence”, which implies that the 
response variables are mutually independent given the latent variable. This means that within 
the latent classes, only random relationships among variables remain, and LCA assigns the 
units into latent classes so that the indicators are uncorrelated within each class.  
Formally, the local independence assumption implies that the observed indicators 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 are 
mutually independent given the latent variable, i.e. they are connected only indirectly through 
the common latent variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗. The latent variable is assumed to explain all the associations 
among the manifest variables. Standard LCA determines the smallest number of latent classes 
sufficient to account for the associations among the manifest variables. Given the local 
independence assumption, the probability of observed data can be written as: 
 
𝑃(𝒀𝒋|𝒁𝑗) = ∑ [𝑃(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝒁𝑗
𝑔)[∏ ∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡|𝑊𝑗, 𝒁𝑖𝑗) ∏ 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑋𝑖𝑗 , 𝑊𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1 )
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
]]𝑀𝑚
=1
 
 
where three components can be identified, each specified using a multinomial logit 
specification, as: 
 
1) the latent class probability at regional level; 
2) the latent class probability at individual level; 
3) the conditional probability of individual response pattern.  
 
The latent class probability at regional level is the probability of region j belonging to a 
particular class of the latent variable 𝑊𝑗, given the regional covariates: 
 
𝑃(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝒁𝑗
𝑔) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛼0𝑚 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑚𝑍𝑙𝑗
𝑔)𝑙
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0𝑚′ + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑚′𝑍𝑙𝑗
𝑔)𝑙
𝑀
𝑚′=1
 
 
where 𝑙 is an index for the group-level covariates. It is assumed that the probability of latent 
class membership at regional level depends on the category effect of  the latent variable at 
regional level 𝛼0𝑚 and on the effects of the contextual (group level) covariates on 𝑊𝑗. These 
probabilities provide information about the distribution of the population among the regional 
classes.  
In contrast, the latent class probability at individual level is the probability that the 
respondent i of the j-th region belongs to a particular class of the individual level latent 
variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗, given regional latent class membership and the individual covariates: 
 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝒁𝑖𝑗 ) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛾0𝑡𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑙𝑖𝑗)𝑙
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾0𝑡′𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑡′𝑍𝑙𝑖𝑗)𝑙
𝑀
𝑡′=1
 
 
where 𝑙 is an index for the individual-level covariates. It is assumed that the probability of 
belonging to a certain individual level latent class depends on the group-level latent variable 
(𝛾0𝑡𝑚 captures the differences between the classes of 𝑊𝑗 in the category effect of 𝑋𝑖𝑗) and on 
the individual level covariates. These provide information about the distribution of the 
population among the individual classes. 
Finally, the conditional probability of individual response pattern is the joint probability of 
the i-th respondent following the pattern 𝑠𝑖 given individual and regional latent class 
membership: 
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∏ 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡, 𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚)
𝐾
𝑘=1  =  
∏
exp (𝛽0𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑘𝑚)
∑ exp (𝛽0𝑠′ + 𝛽1𝑠′𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠′𝑚)
𝑆𝑘
𝑠′=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
 
where 𝛽0𝑠𝑘 represents the specific effect of the response category and 𝛽1𝑠𝑘𝑡 is the main effect 
of the individual latent variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗. According to the different indicators, conditional 
probabilities can be modelled in different ways assuming also direct effects of the group-level 
latent variable 𝛽2𝑠𝑘𝑚. In this case both the individual level class proportion and the class-
specific probabilities depend on 𝑊𝑗. 
These probabilities provide information that is useful to describe the latent classes, and to 
obtain a profile for the latent classes according to which responses are prevalent in each of 
them. 
 
 
3.2 Data and variables  
 
In this section, we describe the data and variables used to develop the IdentEU probabilistic 
model aimed to classify individuals and regions according to their identification with the EU 
project on the basis of the results of previous deliverables (see Section 1) and from the 
literature review (see section 2).  
In particular, for building the model we rely on two sources of data:  
 
- The PERCEIVE Survey (D1.2); 
- A dataset collecting socio-economic variables at regional level developed within the 
PERCEIVE project (D2.1).  
 
The PERCEIVE Survey was designed by the University of Gothenburg as a specific task of 
the PERCEIVE project. The survey collects information from a sample of 17.147 individuals 
of 18 years of age or older from 15 EU member States and was conducted during the summer 
of 2017. The survey design and preliminary results are described in Bauhr and Charron 
(2018).  
The survey includes 35 questions regarding different aspects, focusing on: i) respondents’ 
awareness of EU Regional Policy, ii) their identification with Europe, country, region, and 
European values, iii) their Political attitudes and values. In addition, the survey includes 
questions aimed to measure the respondents’ support for the Cohesion Policy, as well as their 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 1 shows the composition of the 
sample by country.  
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Table 1. Sample composition: number of respondents, their percentage distribution, and 
number of regions by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regional aggregation in the survey is at level NUTS2 for the majority of the countries in 
the sample, except for Germany, UK and Sweden (level of aggregation at NUTS1), and for 
Latvija and Estonia (the whole country).  
The second source is a dataset that brings together information from several official 
secondary sources at regional level (NUTS1 and NUTS2) in a panel format (Charron, 2017). 
We use the PERCEIVE survey’s questions to select the manifest variables as proxies to the 
latent construct of identification with EU, i.e. the K manifest variables labelled 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 in the 
methodological section. We start from the set of variables used in Royuela (2018) in building 
the synthetic indicator for identification with EU. These variables allow us to represent the 
three components of the concept of individual identification described in section 2, i.e. 
“awareness”, “evaluation”, “attachment”.  
 
As regards the component “awareness”, we use the responses to the questions:  
Q1. Have you ever heard about the following EU policies? (EU Cohesion Policy; EU 
Regional Policy; EU Structural Funds; any EU funded project in your region or area) 
We recoded the responses to build up a variable with three categories: 0 -None of them; 1 – 
Only local project; 2 – At least one. 
The category “Only local project” includes people who responded they know only EU funded 
project in their region or area, while the category “At least one” includes people who know at 
least one among Cohesion Policy, EU Regional Policy, and  EU Structural Funds. 
 
Q3. Have you ever benefited in your daily life from any project funded by the EU? 
This is a binary variable with the following categories: 1 – Yes; 2 - No 
Country Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
distribution 
Number 
of regions 
    
France 1,500 8.75 22 
Bulgaria 503 2.93 6 
Slovakia 1,014 5.91 4 
Hungary 1,000 5.83 7 
Romania 1,015 5.92 8 
Italy 2,000 11.66 17 
Netherlands 500 2.92 14 
Sweden 580 3.38 3 
UK 1,500 8.75 12 
Latvija 500 2.92 1 
Poland 2,000 11.66 16 
Spain 2,014 11.75 17 
Germany 1,500 8.75 16 
Estonia 521 3.04 1 
Austria 1,000 5.83 9 
    
Total 17,147 100 153 
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Moreover, we include the responses to the question regarding the strength of identification 
with Europe, Country, and Region: 
 
Q9. On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being “I don’t identify at all” and ‘10’ being “I identify 
very strongly”, how strongly you identify yourself with the following: Q9_1: Your 
region; Q9_1: Your country; Q9_3: Europe? 
The original scale would lead to consider too many categories, implying a very large number 
of parameters in the model and consequently possible estimation problems, hence we decided 
to group the values in a smaller number of categories. To this end, we group the responses in 
the original scale into three categories of identification level: 1 – Not strongly (including the 
values 0, 1, 2, 3); 2 – somewhat strongly (including values 4, 5, 6); 3 – Strongly (including 
values 7, 8, 9, 10). We opted  for this classification on the basis of the distribution of the 
original responses, which shows a concentration in the central and extreme categories, while 
respondents  are more uniformly distributed in the intermediated ones; moreover it solve the 
problem of where to assign the central value in the case of an even number categories. 
We consider one variable describing the level of identification with EU and build other two 
variables comparing the level of identification in EU to the level of identification with the 
country and the region respectively: 
- Identification with EU: 1 – Not strongly; 2 – Somewhat strongly; 3 - Strongly 
- Identification with EU vs Country: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
- Identification with EU vs Region: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
 
As regards the component “Evaluation”, we use the responses to the questions: 
Q5. How effective do you think the following institutions will be at dealing with the 
biggest problem in your region? (Q5_1: The European Union; Q5_2: National 
governing institutions; Q5_3: Regional/local governing institutions)  
Then, moving from the responses to Q5 (but inverting the ordering of the scale), we build the 
following three variables: 
- Effectiveness of EU: 1: Not so effective; 2 – Somewhat effective; 3 – Very effective 
- Effectiveness of EU vs National institution: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
- Effectiveness of EU vs Regional/local institution: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
 
Q8. In general, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) EU membership is a good 
thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad? 
This question was not posed to UK respondents due to the recent experience of the Brexit 
referendum at the time the Survey was carried out. We construct a variable grouping the 
responses into two categories: 1 – “Good thing”; 0 – “Bad / Neither good nor bad”. We 
imputed UK respondents the value 1 - “Good thing” if they answer they would have voted 
“remain” if the Brexit referendum were held again at the time of the survey, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Q16. On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being that ‘there is no corruption’ and ‘10’ being that 
corruption is widespread, how would you rate: Q16.1: the European Union; Q16.2: 
the national government; Q16.3: the region/local government?  
We build three variables, grouping the responses in the original scale into three categories of 
corruption level: 1 – Low (including the values 0, 1, 2, 3); 2 – Medium (including values 4, 5, 
6); 3 – High (including values 7, 8, 9, 10).  
The first variable we consider regards the perceived level of corruption in EU, the other two 
are obtained comparing the perceived level of corruption in EU to the perceived level of 
corruption in national government and regional government respectively: 
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- Corruption in EU vs National government: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
- Corruption in EU vs Regional/local government: 1 – Less; 2 – Equal; 3 – More 
 
As regards the component “Attachment”, we use the responses to the question: 
Q7. Have you voted in either of the last two EU parliamentary elections?  
We use a variable with the following categories: 0 – Neither; 1 – Once; 2 – Both times 
Moreover, we decided to include another indicator to describe the component “attachment” 
using the responses to the question: 
Q20: In your opinion, the EU should continue this policy, where wealthier countries 
contribute more, and poorer EU regions receive more funding? 
From the original five classes (Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, D/K) we 
obtain 3 classes: 1 – Agree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – D/K. This indicator measures the citizen 
support to the values put forward by EU, hence it may be used to proxy their attachment to 
Europe and other Europeans. 
 
A descriptive analysis regarding each of these variables (and other information from the 
survey) are reported in Bauhr and Charron (2018), as well as in previous deliverables (Lopez-
Bazo and  Royuela, 2017; Royuela, 2018); in particular, in Lopez-Bazo and Royuela (2017) 
there is also an analysis of the distribution of each indicator at the aggregate regional level.  
As for the variables to be included in the model as controls and predictors, we consider the 
individual characteristics as age, education, occupation status and the economic status (see 
table A.2 in appendix for definition and categories). Contextual covariates are introduced at 
the regional level. These regard the level of GDP per inhabitant in Euro at 2014 as percentage 
of EU average, the unemployment rate for people of 20-64 years old at 2014, the per capita 
expenditure of Structural Fund in the whole programming period 2007-13, the European 
Index of Institutional Quality (EQI) at 2013 (normalised at 100), and the absorption rate of 
the Structural Fund financial allocation at 2013.  
While the EQI assesses the institutional quality based on the experiences and perception of 
citizens (Charron et al., 2014), the absorption rate could be considered as an objective 
measure of the regions’ effectiveness and efficiency in programming and implementing 
Cohesion Policy. Several studies show (Bojimans, 2014; Tosun, 2013) a strong correlation 
between absorption rate and institutional quality at country level.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Model specification and estimation 
 
The model estimation requires us to fix the number of classes at the group level and at the 
individual level, i.e. M and T respectively. The final model we present involves 6 latent 
classes at individual level, T=6, and 4 classes at regional level, M=4
2
. 
The choice of the number of individuals’ clusters and groups of regions is determined by the 
comparison of alternative model specifications, and by selecting among models by the 
minimum BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) rule (Table A.3 in appendix shows the BIC 
values for different models). For the choice of the final model, we also consider other 
                                                 
2
 For model estimation we use the software LATENT GOLD 5.1 (Vermunt and Magdison, 2016) 
  
 17 
measures that are useful for the interpretation of the model, such as bivariate residuals, 
classification errors and the profile of the different classes associated to the model.  
Bivariate residuals (BVR) are useful to check for the presence of residual association 
between pairs of variables after the model estimation. During the phase of model selection, 
the analysis of residuals helped in selecting the most appropriate indicators, as well as the 
number of latent classes to retain.  
Among the indicators presented in Section 3, some of them have been discarded from the 
final analysis because high residual associations after model estimation indicate redundant 
information. In particular, the indicator obtained from question Q3 (Have you ever benefited 
in your daily life from any project funded by the EU?) is redundant with respect to the 
information brought by the indicator “Awareness of Cohesion Policy”, as well as all the 
indicators measuring the level of identification with Europe, and EU effectiveness and 
corruption in comparison with regional/local level institutions that are high correlated with 
the same variables measured at the national level.  
Inspection of bivariate residual during the model selection process, moreover, can provide 
information for the need of relaxing the local independence assumption and considering 
direct effects of level-2 latent variable and covariates on indicators, or between indicators 
themselves. Hence, in the specification of the final version of the model, we also make the 
following assumptions: 
 
- The existence of a direct effect of the latent variable at regional level 𝑊𝑗  on the indicator 
“Evaluation of EU membership” (from question Q8), which measures how individual 
evaluate the EU membership of their country. High residual association (not explained by 
the model) of this indicator with many contextual covariates at regional level has lead us 
to suppose that the regional contextual environment can probably have a direct influence 
on whether people think the EU membership is a good o a bad thing. 
- The existence of a direct effect of the amount of Structural Funds (SF) expenses at 
regional level (per capita SF expenses in the region in the programming period 2007-13) 
on the indicator “Awareness of Cohesion Policy”, which describes to what extent 
individuals know Cohesion Policy; here the rationale is that people more likelihood know 
Cohesion Policy if they live in regions where the amount of EU financial funding is 
higher. 
 
Some associations (high residuals) between certain indicators, and between covariates and 
indicators, still remain after controlling for the latent variables. However, relaxing 
conditional independence assumption for all these cases would increase too much the number 
of parameters, then implying computational problems. Moreover, increasing the number of 
latent classes does not improve significantly neither the model fitting nor its interpretation. 
Thus, the choice of the final model specification was based on the interpretability of the 
latent classes too. 
We comment the results in 4.2 by looking at the estimated probabilities. 
 
 
4.2 Description of clusters at the individual level 
 
We consider the classification of individuals based on the posterior class membership 
probability. This classification gives information on how well one can predict to which latent 
class individuals belong given their observed indicators and covariates patterns. For each 
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subject i with certain covariates and response pattern s, the probability of belonging to the 
latent class t of 𝑋𝑖 can be obtained by means of the Bayesian rule: 
 
?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝒁𝑖) =
?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝒁𝑖)?̂?(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡, 𝒁𝑖) 
?̂?(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠|𝒁𝑖)
 
 
where the numerator and the denominator are the Maximum Likelihood estimates. 
The most common classification rule consists to assign each individual to the latent class 
with the highest ?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝒁𝑖) (modal assignment). The classification table (Table 2) 
cross-tabulates posterior and modal class membership probabilities (Vermunt and Magidson, 
2016). Each entry in the table represents the sum of the class t posterior membership 
probabilities for the cases allocated to each modal class. The off-diagonals cases are the 
misclassified ones, underlying which latent classes are well separated.  
 
Table 2. Classification table of latent variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗 based on posterior class membership 
probabilities  ?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝑍𝑖) 
 Modal assignment 
Probabilistic Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Cluster5 Cluster6 Total 
Cluster1 4246.4 117.1 0.3 186.9 58.7 13.5 4622.7 
Cluster2 82.9 3012.1 0.0 1.7 181.9 86.8 3365.4 
Cluster3 0.2 0.0 2960.8 0.2 46.9 17.2 3025.3 
Cluster4 331.7 3.7 0.0 2113.4 4.4 66.6 2519.9 
Cluster5 58.0 127.0 35.4 0.3 1473.5 83.9 1778.1 
Cluster6 18.8 65.2 41.5 44.4 79.7 1428.0 1677.5 
Total 4738.0 3325.0 3038.0 2347.0 1845.0 1696.0 16989.0 
 
The classification error, ranging from 0 to 1, is the proportion of misclassified cases and it 
helps to evaluate the distinctiveness of different classes. This proportion indicates how well 
the model can predict latent class membership given the value of indicators and covariates. 
Concerning our final model specification, the classification error of individuals is 0.10. Table 
2 shows that Cluster 1 is well distinct from Clusters 3, 5 and 6; Cluster 2 is well distinct from 
Clusters 3, 4 and 6; and Cluster 3 is well distinct from Clusters 4, 5 and 6. In contrast, 
misclassification happens between Clusters 1 and 4, which share similar aspects, and to a 
lesser extent between Cluster 2 and Clusters 1 and 5. 
The profile table (Table 3) shows the characteristics of each cluster, similarities and 
differences. In the first row, the estimated marginal latent probabilities ?̂?(𝑋 = 𝑡), obtained 
by aggregating the model probabilities ?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑍𝑖) over covariates values when the model 
contains covariates (Vermunt and Magidson, 2016), are reported. 
The other values represent the class-specific marginal probabilities associated with each 
indicator  𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑋 = 𝑡) describing how the latent classes are related to the indicator 
variables. These probabilities sum to 1 within each class. By analysing the profile table, we 
can characterize and name each class of the latent variable in terms of response probability to 
each level of the indicators
3
.  
                                                 
3
 In LCA models with direct effects of covariates on indicators and direct association between indicators, 
probabilities should be obtained by aggregating, for each indicator, over the other variables involved in the 
effects specification. Also, in multilevel models with direct effect of group level latent variable on one or more 
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In the final model, we identify six clusters of respondent types. The clusters are ranked by 
their size, from the largest to the smallest: Cluster 1 is composed by 27% of individuals, 
Cluster 2 by about 20% and the smallest is Cluster 6 comprises 10% of individuals. 
Looking at marginal probabilities for each indicator, we clearly identify three clusters of 
individuals that, more than others, strongly identify with Europe, and three clusters of 
individuals that, more than others, do not considerably identify with Europe. The probability 
to identify strongly with Europe is very high, about 0.9 or more, for individuals in Clusters 4, 
1 and 3. On the contrary, individuals in Cluster 2 have the highest probability to respond they 
do not identify at all or not too much (0.46). Individuals in Cluster 5 and 6 have very small 
probability to answer that they strongly identify with Europe but have a higher probability to 
identify somewhat stronger compared to Cluster 2.  
Regarding the second indicator in the table (Europe vs Country identification), which 
measures the strength of individual identification with Europe compared to his own country, 
we observe that individuals in Clusters 1, 3 and 4 identify with Europe as strongly as they 
identify with their own country, while individuals in Clusters 2, 5 or 6 have the highest 
chance to identify less with Europe than with their country. 
However, we find differences among clusters inside each of these two groups when 
considering how they evaluate the effectiveness in solving problems and the level of 
corruption of EU institutions. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
indicators, the marginal probabilities are obtained summing over the classes of this latent variable (see Vermunt 
and Magidson 2016 for further details). 
  
 20 
Table 3.  Profile table of the latent variable at individual level 𝑋𝑖𝑗: size class  ?̂?(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑍𝑖)  
and class specific marginal probabilities  𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑋 = 𝑡) 
 Cluster 1 
Disappointend 
pro- Europe 
Cluster 2 
EU 
Deniers 
Cluster 3 
Confident 
Europeans 
Cluster 4 
Wary pro-
Europe 
Cluster 5 
Disaffected 
Europeans 
Cluster 6 
Wary Cons- 
Europe 
Cluster Size 0.2727 0.1972 0.1752 0.1495 0.1056 0.0999 
Indicators       
How strongly identify with Europe       
Not much strongly 0 0.4612 0.0362 0 0.2704 0.2857 
Somewhat 0.0995 0.5387 0.0681 0.0726 0.7293 0.7142 
Strongly 0.9005 0 0.8957 0.9273 0.0003 0.0001 
Europe vs Country identification       
Less 0 0.6849 0 0 0.6716 0.7187 
Equal 0.8595 0.2942 0.8271 0.8557 0.3193 0.2573 
More 0.1405 0.0209 0.1729 0.1443 0.0091 0.0241 
Effectiveness in solving problems       
Not so Effective 0.7413 0.9007 0.3498 0.0001 0.7966 0.0001 
Somewhat effective 0.2587 0.0957 0.4656 0.6501 0.2033 0.7156 
Very effective 0 0.0036 0.1845 0.3498 0 0.2843 
EU vs National effectiveness       
Less 0.3386 0.3069 0.1694 0.0071 0.3654 0.0085 
Equal 0.6614 0.6931 0.5138 0.4274 0.6346 0.4143 
More 0 0 0.3168 0.5655 0 0.5772 
Corruption in EU       
Low 0.082 0.0006 0.3341 0.0846 0.2302 0.1165 
Medium 0.3462 0.1368 0.6659 0.2663 0.7697 0.3861 
High 0.5718 0.8625 0 0.6491 0.0001 0.4974 
EU vs National Corruption       
Less 0.0001 0 0.9998 0 0.5253 0.255 
Equal 0.7792 0.729 0.0002 0.8458 0.4226 0.6135 
More 0.2207 0.2709 0 0.1542 0.0522 0.1315 
Vote       
Neither 0.2869 0.3916 0.2533 0.2642 0.3904 0.3718 
Once 0.1481 0.1433 0.168 0.1755 0.1924 0.1797 
Both times 0.5468 0.4456 0.5561 0.5423 0.3945 0.4181 
(d/k-refused) 0.0182 0.0195 0.0227 0.018 0.0226 0.0304 
Support to Cohesion policy       
Agree 0.8291 0.6238 0.9022 0.8845 0.7556 0.8007 
Disagree 0.1576 0.3642 0.087 0.1061 0.2271 0.1832 
d/k 0.0133 0.012 0.0108 0.0094 0.0173 0.0162 
EU membership       
Bad thing 0.2751 0.7464 0.1743 0.1727 0.4786 0.4718 
Good Thing 0.7249 0.2536 0.8257 0.8273 0.5214 0.5282 
Awareness of Cohesion policy       
None 0.1819 0.2664 0.1019 0.1141 0.2578 0.2082 
only local project 0.0863 0.1053 0.1291 0.1023 0.1078 0.1236 
Cohesion/regional policies 0.7318 0.6283 0.769 0.7836 0.6344 0.6683 
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Actually, individuals in Cluster 1 evaluate the effectiveness of EU in solving the problems 
more negatively than others, judging it even less effective or at same level than the national 
governing institutions, and they perceive a high level of corruption in EU institutions, equal 
or more widespread than in national institutions. Regarding the issue of redistribution, 
according to which richer countries should contribute more to the EU Cohesion Policy and 
poorest regions should receive more, individuals in Cluster 1 “Disappointed pro-Europe” 
agree with high probability (even if this is not the highest across clusters). Moreover, with 
high probability, they evaluate the EU membership as a good thing (though the probability is 
the lowest among Clusters 1, 3 and 4). The probability that people know the existence of 
Cohesion Policy is high as well as in all clusters, nevertheless, people in this group has a 
higher chance than Cluster 4 or 3 to be aware of any European policy.  
“Confident Europeans” (Clusters 3), who adhere to the values and identify themselves but 
consider the action of the European Union to be less effective, and “Wary pro-Europe” 
(Cluster 4), who consider the European Union to be effective, they adhere to values and 
identify themselves but see a lot of corruption, are similar in many regards: these include 
people with a high probability to strongly identify with Europe, even more than how much 
the identify with their countries, which think the EU membership is a good thing and that 
strongly agree with the values of solidarity represented by the cohesion policy. 
They have a somewhat different view regarding the effectiveness of EU because people in 
Cluster 3, Confident Europeans, judge the action of EU in solving problems not so effective 
and less effective than national government action more likely than people in Cluster 4. On 
the contrary, individuals in Cluster 3, Confident Europeans, trust the EU institutions more 
than people in Cluster 4, Wary pro-Europe, because they more likely perceive a lower level 
of corruption in EU, even respect to their national governing institutions. The Clusters 2, 5 
and 6 include people with, in comparison with the others Clusters, a weaker identification 
with Europe: especially in Cluster 2, EU Deniers, is null the probability that people strongly 
identify with Europe, and is 46%, the highest among all clusters, the probability that people 
do not identify at all with EU. Generally, in each of these three clusters people identify 
stronger with their own countries. Cluster 2, EU Deniers, emerges as the group characterized 
by the mostly negative attitude toward many aspects considered by the indicators: they 
consider (with probability 0.9) the EU is not effective in solving problems of their region and 
less effective than national government, they think (with probability 0.86) that corruption is 
widespread in EU institutions, as like as in national institution and even more, and they think 
that the EU membership is a bad thing (with probability 0.74). Nevertheless, the majority still 
agree with the policy of sustaining the poorest regions but the proportion of individuals who 
disagree with this policy is the highest across clusters (36%). Cluster 5 and 6 have in 
common with Cluster 2 the stronger identification with their own countries than with Europe 
but the identification with Europe is somewhat stronger and people less likely evaluating the 
EU membership as a bad thing (they are equally divided). For the majority they agree with 
the policy of supporting the poorest region. Instead, they show very different attitude 
regarding two main aspects: “Disaffected Europeans” (Cluster 5, cons a not effective EU) 
negatively evaluate the effectiveness of EU in solving problems in their region (with 
probability about 0.80) and consider national government as well as or more effective; on the 
contrary people in Cluster 6 positively evaluate the effectiveness of EU institutions even in 
comparison to the national institutions. 
Regarding the level of corruption, the situation is reversed: in Cluster 5, the probability of 
considering high the level of corruption in EU institution is zero, while in Cluster 6, Wary 
cons Europeans (cons a corrupted EU) more people perceive higher level of corruption (with 
probability 0.50) As for cohesion policy, Clusters 2, and Cluster 5 have the largest proportion 
of people who do not agree with the current financial support policy by EU. Measuring how 
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many times people voted in the last two elections has the last association with the latent 
variable X and so it does not discriminate too much among the clusters; anyway, Cluster 2 
and Cluster 5 have the highest probability (40%) of not voting both the times, while this 
probability is lower in Cluster 3 and 4.  
 
 
4.3 Identifying groups of regions 
 
As for individual clusters, we can obtain a global synthesis of the characteristics also for the 
latent classes of 𝑊𝑗 from the profile Table 4. The first row shows the size of the classes at 
regional level ?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚). Since model specification contains group-level covariates, the 
probabilities?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚)  are computed aggregating the model probabilities?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝒁𝑗
𝑔)  
over the values of group-level covariates. These probabilities are called prior or model 
probabilities. 
Moreover, Table 4 shows, for each category of the indicators, the group-region specific 
probabilities  𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚) given the latent class. 
Looking at these probabilities, the classes 1 and 4 can be identified both as group of regions 
which, among all the regions take into account, have the weaker level of identification with 
Europe, especially in comparison with country identification, and quite critics against the EU 
institutions. They have quite similar profile along many dimensions: people think that the EU 
is not very effective in solving problems of the region (with probability of 0.62), and that 
corruption in EU institutions is widespread. Although the probability to agree with the EU 
policy of supporting the poorest region is high (77%), this value is lower than that observed 
in Group 2 and Group 3. Possibly, Group 4 “Low EU identification – Skeptical” is 
characterized by the worst attitude of people toward EU membership of their countries: more 
than half of the people in regions of Group 4 consider, more than peoples in other groups, the 
EU membership a bad thing, even more than Group 1 (where the same probability is 0.44). 
Another difference between the two groups regards the awareness of the Cohesion Policy: the 
chance that people do not know any EU policy is 27% in Group 1 “Lower EU 
identification” while it is 14% in Group 4, with a greater proportion of people knowing 
cohesion/regional policies financed by EU. 
On the contrary, Group 2 “High EU identification” can be labelled as the group of regions 
with high level of identification with Europe and where people have a higher level of trust 
and appreciation for EU institution: this group has, in comparison with the other groups, the 
highest probability of strongly identifying with Europe (0.62), and most people agree to 
support poorest regions (with probability 0.83). People in these regions have a high chance to 
consider the EU membership a good thing (with probability 0.71) and they consider EU 
institutions effective in solving problems with probability greater than 60%; moreover, there 
is a larger proportion of people that think EU is more effective than national government 
(probability about 0.3). In addition, this group have the lowest probability to perceive high 
level of corruption in EU.  
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Table 4. Profile table of the latent variable at regional leve𝑊𝑗l: size class ?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝑍𝑗
𝑔) and 
class specific marginal probabilities ?̂?(𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑠𝑘|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚) 
 Group 1 
Lower EU 
identification 
Group 2 
High EU 
identification 
Group 3 
Medium-high EU 
identification – Critics    
Group 4  
Low EU identification 
– Skeptical 
Group Size 0.386 0.322 0.151 0.142 
Indicators     
How strongly identify with Europe     
Not much strongly 0.195 0.119 0.130 0.179 
Somewhat 0.360 0.261 0.282 0.318 
Strongly 0.445 0.620 0.588 0.504 
Europe vs Country identification     
Less 0.349 0.221 0.241 0.304 
Equal 0.569 0.666 0.658 0.605 
More 0.081 0.113 0.101 0.092 
Effectiveness in solving problems     
Not so Effective 0.619 0.381 0.577 0.625 
Somewhat effective 0.303 0.449 0.335 0.299 
Very effective 0.079 0.171 0.088 0.076 
EU vs National effectiveness     
Less 0.256 0.168 0.249 0.259 
Equal 0.608 0.534 0.598 0.610 
More 0.136 0.298 0.152 0.131 
Corruption in EU     
Low 0.107 0.161 0.111 0.119 
Medium 0.374 0.431 0.381 0.383 
High 0.519 0.409 0.508 0.498 
EU vs National Corruption     
Less 0.188 0.358 0.170 0.233 
Equal 0.636 0.517 0.657 0.597 
More 0.175 0.125 0.174 0.170 
Vote     
Neither 0.333 0.303 0.316 0.325 
Once 0.161 0.167 0.160 0.159 
Both times 0.486 0.509 0.504 0.496 
(d/k-refused) 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.020 
Support to Cohesion policy     
Agree 0.771 0.831 0.800 0.779 
Disagree 0.216 0.157 0.187 0.208 
d/k 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 
EU membership     
Bad thing 0.444 0.291 0.238 0.563 
Good Thing 0.556 0.710 0.762 0.437 
Awareness of Cohesion policy     
None 0.266 0.123 0.224 0.140 
Only local project 0.085 0.122 0.090 0.122 
Cohesion/regional policies 0.649 0.755 0.686 0.738 
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Finally, the regions in Group 3 “Medium-high EU identification – Critics” have a profile in 
between these two extremes. In particular, in these regions there is a relatively high 
proportion of people that strongly identify with Europe, as strong as with their own country, 
and about 80% of people that approve the EU financial support of poorest regions. Moreover, 
the proportion of people that think the EU membership is a good thing is the highest 
(probability 0.76). However, the perception of efficacy and corruption of EU institutions is 
not so good as in the regions of Group 2. Actually, people has 57% chance of answering that 
EU is not effective in solving region’s problems and 25% probability of responding EU is 
less effective than national government, as well as 51% chance of answering that corruption 
in EU institutions is high. Moreover, compared to Group 2, it is higher the probability that 
people do not know any EU financed policy (0.22), a value similar to Group 1 more than to 
Group 2.  
Regional classification reflects, to some extent, individual typologies, even if in this case 
differences are less marked. Computing the probability of being in a certain latent class of 𝑋𝑖𝑗  
for each level m of 𝑊𝑗, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚), we can quantify the influence of the latent 
classes at individual level across latent classes at regional level.  
Table 5 shows the relationship between the individual and the regional classes. The relative 
size of individual clusters within a group of regions can reveal different structures for the 
latent variable “identification” across regions, depending on the effect of latent variable at 
regional level. In this case, there is some overlap in the composition by clusters of each 
regions’ group. Consistent with the previous analysis, Group 2 is composed for about 50% by 
Clusters 3 and 4, hence those individuals with a high level of identification and a positive 
evaluation of EU institution on both dimension. Group 3 is composed by 40% of individual 
classified in Cluster 1, and in minor proportion by Cluster 4 and 2. Group 1 and Group 4 have 
quite similar profile, since they are composed for the majority by the two Clusters 1 and 2 
with a little bit higher proportion of Cluster 1 in Group 4; the difference is the presence of a 
certain proportion of Cluster 5 in Group 1 and of Cluster 3 in Group 4. We note the presence 
of a certain proportion of Cluster 1 in each group, which is a cluster composed by people that 
strongly identify with Europe but that do not trust European institutions.  
 
 
Table 5. Cross-tabulation of the probability of being in each latent class of 𝑋𝑖𝑗 for each level 
of  𝑊𝑗:  ?̂?(𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚) 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Overall 
Group class Size 0.386 0.322 0.151 0.142  
Clusters      
Cluster1 0.284 0.184 0.409 0.319 0.273 
Cluster2 0.285 0.106 0.165 0.267 0.197 
Cluster3 0.087 0.290 0.091 0.165 0.175 
Cluster4 0.108 0.216 0.141 0.088 0.150 
Cluster5 0.154 0.060 0.116 0.111 0.106 
Cluster6 0.082 0.145 0.078 0.052 0.100 
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4.4 Mapping the level of identification with EU across European regions 
 
Figure 1 shows the regions’ classification across the four groups using a modal assignment 
based on prior marginal probabilities (the region is assigned to the group corresponding to the 
highest prior probability).  
 
Figure 1. Regions classification in latent variable group 𝑊𝑗 based on prior probabilities
 
Group 1 – Lower EU identification  
Group 2 – High EU identification 
Group 3 – Medium-high EU identification – Critics     
Group 4 – Low EU identification – Skeptical 
 
 
The largest group is Group 1 “Lower EU identification” that comprises most of the regions in 
the northern countries of Europe: Sweden, almost all regions in UK, except for the London 
and South-East regions, and North Ireland, Netherland, almost all regions from France and 
the northern regions of Germany. Belong to this group also the regions from the North and 
the Centre of Italy and some Austrian regions. The rest of Italian regions (located in the 
South) are classified to belong to Group 4 “Low EU identification – Skeptical”, where people 
are possibly even more critics against EU than people in Group 1. To this group belong also 
the regions in Hungary and some from Slovakia. On the contrary, all of the Polish regions, 
the regions from Romania, Estonia and Latvjia, and almost all regions from Bulgaria belong 
to Group 2 “High EU identification”: people identify strongly with Europe, believe the 
membership of their country to EU is a good thing, and trust EU institutions. Almost all the 
Spanish regions belong to the same group too, except for three of them. In Group 3 
“Medium-high EU identification – Critics” are classified the central regions from Germany 
and some regions from Austria, plus the regions of London and South-East in UK. This group 
is characterized by a high level of identification with Europe, nevertheless they evaluate not 
much positively the effectiveness and the level of corruption of European institutions. 
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The assignment of regions to a specific level-2 group is better evaluated by considering the 
posterior membership probability, which represents the probability for a given region j of 
belonging to latent cluster m of W given the responses of all its individuals 𝑌𝑗   and their 
covariates 𝒁𝑗: 
 
?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝑌𝑗 = 𝑠, 𝒁𝑗) =
?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝑔) ∏ ?̂?(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝒁𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1 )
?̂?(𝑌𝑗 = 𝑠|𝒁𝑗)
 
 
We can obtain a classification table that compares the results of the classification through 
modal assignment based on posterior probabilities (Table 6). The classification error is 0.024, 
which means that only few regions have similar posterior probabilities across some groups, in 
particular for regions classified in Group 1 and 4.  
 
Table 6. Classification table of regional latent variable 𝑊𝑗 based on group-level posterior 
membership probabilities ?̂?(𝑊𝑗 = 𝑚|𝑌𝑗 = 𝑠, 𝑍𝑗) 
Posterior group  
membership probability 
Modal classification 
 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 57.38 0.29 0.32 0.36 58.35 
2 0.02 48.67 0.00 0.00 48.70 
3 0.95 0.00 21.68 0.00 22.63 
4 1.65 0.04 0.00 19.64 21.33 
Total 60 49 22 20 151 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the assignment of the regions to the different groups based on posterior 
probabilities. The comparison between the two probabilities sets (prior and posterior) 
highlights to what extent the individual responses can change the probability to belong to a 
specific group. In fact, while the prior probabilities are obtained according to the group level 
covariates only (i.e. are model’s parameters), the posterior probabilities are conditioned both 
on the individual responses and covariates patterns. Discrepancies between the two set of 
probabilities highlight that the group level covariates are useful to describe the socio-
economic context. The inclusion of individual responses adds the relevant information which 
allows for a better prediction of the group membership for the regions concerned. In 
particular, 33 out of 151 regions are classified differently after accounting for the individual 
responses. These are the regions in the North of Italy, some German and Austrian regions, 
Latvija and Estonia, plus others single regions in different countries (three regions in each 
country of Spain, Slovakia, and Bulgaria; two regions from UK, one each from Hungary, 
France, and Romania). Group-level probabilities and respective modal group assignment 
corresponding to the two sets of probabilities are reported in Table A.3 in Appendix ( 
the thirty-three regions that change classification are highlighted in grey).  In many cases, the 
group prior probabilities are close each other. For example, in some regions the membership 
probabilities are almost equally divided by two specific groups: in this case the change of 
group membership regards the two groups with the highest prior probabilities. The regions 
Niedersachsen (D9) and Schleswig-Holstein (DEF) have a prior probability close to 0.50 to 
be classified in Group 1 and Group 3, as like Steiermark (AT22), Ugozapaden (BG41), 
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Trentino-Alto Adige (ITH1), Western Slovakia (SK02) and Central Slovakia (SK03), and 
South-East England (UKJ). In other cases, instead, the region has significant prior probability 
to be classified in every group: Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE) has probabilities between 0.22-0.29 to 
belong to each group from 1 to 4; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE8), Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra (ES22), Central Hungary (HU10), Bratislava Region (SK01), and Estonia all have 
three membership prior probabilities equal at least 20% or more. Generally, change in 
classification happens between the two groups with the highest probabilities.  
There are some exceptions. Some regions in Italy (ITC1: Piemonte, ITC4: Lombardia, ITH3: 
Veneto, ITH5: Emilia-Romagna) have very high prior probability to belong to Group 1 and 
are classified to Group 4 by posterior probability; however, the profile of two groups are 
quite similar in many respects. Latvija has a high prior probability to be classified in Group 2 
(0.80) and probability 0.19 to be classified in Group 4, which become equal to 1 if we 
consider posterior probability. The region Bucuresti-Ilfov (RO32) in Romania, on the 
contrary has probability 0.8 to belong to Group 4 and probability 0.15 to belong to Group 2 
but considering the pattern of responses it is assigned to Group 2 with certainty. Two regions 
from Bulgaria (BG33: Severoiztochen and BG34: Ugoiztochen) are classified in Group 2 
with very high prior probability but in Group 1 by posterior probability, while one region in 
Germany (DE3: Berlin) passed from Group 1 (with prior probability 0.80) to Group 3 (with 
posterior probability 1). For most of these cases, posterior probabilities are either zero or one, 
so we can conclude that the context covariates considered in the analysis do not allow to 
predict group membership very well, at least for these cases.   
In comparison with Figure 1, we see now that all the UK regions and the North Ireland, all 
the French regions, Netherland, Sweden and Estonia are more likely to be classified in Group 
1, which together with regions in Group 4 are characterized by a lower level of identification 
and the most critics against EU institutions. Now most of the German regions, except 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and the regions from Austria are classified in Group 3, which is 
a group that identify with EU even if they are critics about some aspects. Most of the regions 
in countries of Eastern Europe, except the regions from Hungary, are classified in Group 2: 
they have the highest level of identification with Europe and trust EU on effectiveness and 
corruption. In this group are even all the Spanish regions. Note that Estonia and Latvija are 
now classified quite differently: the former is classified in Group 1 and the latter in Group 4 
that are regions that identify the lowest (previously, they were both classified in Group 2). 
Group 4 now comprises the Northern Italian regions as well, which change classification 
from Group 1 to Group 4, and it includes still all the regions from Hungary, and Corsica. 
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Figure 2.  Regions classification in latent variable group 𝑊𝑗 based on posterior probabilities 
 
Group 1 – Lower EU identification 
Group 2 – High EU identification 
Group 3 – Medium-high EU identification – Critics     
Group 4 – Low EU identification – Skeptical 
 
 
4.5 Ranking of the case study regions 
 
The nine case-study regions of the PERCEIVE project have been selected according to their 
ability to represent the complex and heterogeneous reality of EU Cohesion Policy 
performance and its multidimensional determinants in terms of socio-economic, political and 
demographic development. The sample is balanced between regions targeted for the 
“Competitiveness and Employment” and for the “Convergence” objectives, with Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria accounting for the within-country heterogeneity in European 
Structural Funds support in Italy. Extremadura is the sole Spanish region that stayed under 
the "Convergence" objective in the programming period 2014-2020, whereas Burgenland 
(Austria) was targeted as a former "Convergence" objective region but shifted to "Phasing 
out" in the 2007-2013 programme. 
Great variability in the economic performance can be observed (Table 7) among regions
4
. In 
terms of GDP per capita the three "Competitiveness" Objective regions, Emilia-Romagna, 
Norra Mellansverige and Essex, are in the top 25% percentile of the distribution of the 
regions in EU. The regions covered by the “Convergence” Objective are amongst the poorest 
in Europe. The Romanian and Polish regions’ GDP per capita in 2014 were below the 50% of 
                                                 
4
 A detailed socio-economic analysis of the case-study regions is provided in D1.1 "Report on Regional Case-
Studies". 
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the EU average, Calabria and Extremadura's were below the 60% of the EU average, while 
the GDP of the Burgenland was very close to the European average.  
The unemployment rate mirrors the Convergence/Competitiveness distinction, too: if the 
Competitiveness regions showed an unemployment rate below the 8%, Convergence regions' 
unemployment rate ranges from 9% in Dolnoslaskie up to 29% in Extremadura.  
 
Table 7. Case study regions, socio-economic characteristics 
Region Objective GDP* Unemployment** EQI Absorption 
rate*** 
Structural 
Funds per 
capita**** 
Sud-Est (RO) CONV 25 10,00 13,37 32,14% 934,09 
Dolnoslaskie (PL) CONV 43 9,10 35,49 64,70% 1.741,62 
Warminsko-Mazurskie (PL) CONV 28 9,60 43,99 66,33% 2.058,60 
Extremadura (ES) CONV 56 29,30 54,35 116,02% 2.359,96 
Burgenland (AT) PH-OUT 97 4,70 68,14 77,37% 625,02 
Emilia-Romagna (IT) COMP 118 8,20 31,77 44,44% 107,78 
Calabria (IT) CONV 59 23,10 17,85 50,24% 1.491,24 
Essex (UK) COMP 117 4,50 65,54 59,84% 67,68 
Norra Mellansverige (SE) COMP 139 7,20 74,24 79,09% 436,51 
* Euro per inhabitant in percentage of the EU average, 2014 
** Unemployment rate: population 20-64 years, 2014 
*** Absorption rate of SF expenditures: ratio of SF expenditures up to 2013 to the SF allocation in the 2007-
2013 period 
**** Total expenditures financed by Structural Fund in years 2007-13 divided by the average population in a 
region in the period 2007-13 
 
With respect to quality of institutions, regions from Austria, United Kingdom and Sweden 
hold the top positions of Europe, but the rank can vary when considering different pillars of 
the index. Although the region Emilia-Romagna is one of the best performers in Italy, it ranks 
quite low compared to other European regions due to citizens' perception of corruption and 
personal experiences with bribery in the public sector. Among the sole Convergence 
Objective regions, the situation is much more differentiated. Calabria has one of the lowest 
values of the index in Europe, and performs badly in comparison to other Italian regions, too. 
Romania, among the countries with the lowest performance, has a high level of perceived 
corruption especially in public services, and the Sud-Est (RO) region does not differ from 
Romania's national case. Poland's institutional quality is below the EU average: Dolnośląskie 
and Warmińsko-Mazurskie have both negative score but they have the lowest and the best 
scores, respectively, of all the Polish regions, with the former exhibiting a poor quality of the 
public health care system and police force. Somewhat different is the situation of 
Extremadura (ES), which ranks very similar to the European average and slightly higher than 
the whole Spain, even if they both experienced a decline of the quality of institutions index. 
In 2013 the Structural Funds absorption rate was very differentiated across regions, ranging 
from 116% in Extremadura to 32% in Sud-Est (RO). The absorption rate is distributed among 
regions regardless of their policy objective and the amount of resources available. Looking at 
the Structural Funds per capita, the most benefitted region was Extremadura with €2,359, 
followed by the two Polish regions and Calabria with €1,491. The remaining regions, with 
Structural Funds per capita below €1,000, range from €934 in Sud-Est to €67 in Essex.   
The regions' high variability in terms of macroeconomic context, institutional quality and 
Cohesion Policy's financial allocation reflects into the highly differentiated picture that 
emerges when looking at the regions' levels of identification with the EU (Table 8).  
Table 8. Ranking of the case study regions according to their level of identification 
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Region Objective Group Name 
Sud-Est (RO) CONV 2 High EU identification 
Dolnoslaskie (PL) CONV 2 High EU identification 
Warminsko-Mazurskie (PL) CONV 2 High EU identification 
Extremadura (ES) CONV 2 High EU identification 
Burgenland (AT) PH-OUT 3 Medium-high EU identification – Critics     
Emilia-Romagna (IT) COMP 4 Low EU identification – Skeptical 
Calabria (IT) CONV 4 Low EU identification – Skeptical 
Essex (UK) COMP 1 Lower EU identification 
Norra Mellansverige (SE) COMP 1 Lower EU identification 
 
 
The groups 2 and 3 show higher levels of EU identification and sense of attachment to the 
European project. 
Four out of nine case-study regions are classified within Group 2 “High EU identification”, 
with three of them being part of new accession countries Poland and Romania. These regions 
feature a higher degree of identification with Europe, and their citizens think that EU 
institutions are effective in facing their region's problems. Thirty percent of them also think 
that corruption is more spread in their national institutions than in the European Union's. 
These four regions share a lower than the EU average level of quality of institutions, and are 
among the highest beneficiaries of the Structural Funds, along with Italy's Calabria. 
The only case-study region that belongs to Group 3 “Medium-high Identification – Critics” is 
Burgenland, who detaches from Group 2 because of its citizens' skepticism towards EU 
institutions. Regions in Group 3 do show identification with Europe and support for the 
European project, yet their citizens think that EU institutions are corrupt and not effective in 
facing their regions' needs.  
Essex and Norra Mellansverige belong to the group that includes the highest number of 
European regions: Group 1 “Lower EU identification”. These two regions are among the 
richest of the sample and feature a high level of institutional quality, yet their citizens hardly 
identify themselves with Europe, nor do they consider the EU capable of tackling the 
problems and needs faced by their region. They also think that EU institutions are corrupt, 
more than their national institutions, and even though they sort of know and appreciate 
Cohesion Policy they do not think that the EU membership brings benefits to their country.  
Among the case-study regions of the PERCEIVE project, both Italian regions, Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria, are classified into Cluster 4 which represent a particular case. Despite 
a higher knowledge of Cohesion Policy, their citizens are negative about EU membership, 
consider the EU corrupt as much as their national institutions, and not effective in solving 
their problems.  
Regardless of the differences of the social and economic contexts, the citizens of Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria share a common mistrust towards institutions, both national and 
European, and consider Italy's adhesion to the EU a bad thing for their country. However, 
considering the posterior membership probabilities, conditioned on individual responses and 
covariate patterns (see section 4.4), the differences in economic and social contexts become 
less relevant: Emilia-Romagna, initially placed in Group 1 (where citizens have shown a very 
low identification with the European Union), after considering individual responses, enters 
the same group as Calabria (Group 4), also characterized, as we said, by mistrust of all 
institutions.  
Our results are consistent with the findings from D2.3 (Royuela, 2018). In both analyses the 
Eastern European regions of Romania (Sud Est) and Poland (Dolnoslaskie and Warmińsko-
mazurskie) display the highest values of the Composite Index of European Identity, followed 
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by Extremadura (Spain), while the lowest values of the composite index are reported for 
Norra Mellansverige (Sweden) and for Essex, which are here classified in Group 1 “Lower 
EU identification”. If Royuela (2018) finds average levels of the index in the regions of 
Burgenland (Austria), Emilia-Romagna and Calabria (Italy), in our analysis these regions are 
placed in two intermediate groups (respectively Group 3 “Medium-high EU identification” 
Discouraged and Group 4 “Low EU identification – Skeptical”). These two groups have in 
common the critical attitude toward the effectiveness and corruption of EU. However, 
citizens of regions in Group 3 have a positive opinion about their country’s EU membership 
and show strong identification with Europe, while citizens of regions in Group 4 do not. 
 
Figure 3. Classification of case-study regions
 
 
 
The three dimensions of “Awareness” (in terms of the EU Cohesion Policy and its local 
benefit), “Evaluation” (in terms of perceived effectiveness of political institutions and 
benefits of EU membership) and “Attachment” (participation in the election and support to 
the redistributive role of the EU), play a fundamental role in determining a region's group 
membership. The awareness of EU Cohesion Policy is highest among Sud-Est, Dolnoslaskie, 
Warminsko-Mazurskie and Extremadura, regions of Group 2 “High EU identification” and 
lowest among regions in Group 1 “Lower EU identification” (Essex and Norra 
Mellansverige). 
“Attachment” follows an analogue pattern: citizens of the regions in Group 2 are those who 
are most likely to have voted in both last elections for the European parliament and show a 
high level of support for the EU redistributive policy, followed by the citizens of the regions 
of Group 3 (Burgenland), 4 (Emilia-Romagna and Calabria) and 1.  
The “Evaluation” dimension, on the other hand, is the least coherent of the three. Group 2 
have the highest probability of finding citizens who consider the work of the EU effective 
and who perceive a low level of corruption in the European institutions but, in the other 
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groups, this dimension is more ambiguous. Irrespective of their level of identification with 
Europe and the European project, the citizens in regions belonging to Groups 1, 3 and 4 
consider the European institutions as corrupt and ineffective as much as their national peers. 
 
 
4.6 Effects of covariates 
 
Membership to individual latent classes is related to individual demographic or socio-
economic characteristics. The probability that an individual belongs to a particular latent 
class has been modelled to depend on age of individuals (considered as continuous variable), 
the level of education, and the income level. The effects of covariates depend on logit 
parameters. However, in order to facilitate the interpretation, we present the class 
membership probabilities given each level of each covariate, 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑡|𝒁𝑝 = 𝑧), computed 
aggregating over the categories of the other covariates, and over the latent variable at group 
level 𝑊𝑗 (Table 9). 
For each row in correspondence to a specific range of values for a covariate the values 
reported are the probabilities to be classified in each cluster, which can be compared to the 
overall distribution reported in the first row (the latent class sizes - unconditional 
probabilities). The variable age is introduced in the model as a continuous variable, but the 
probabilities are calculated for age classes (automatically determined dividing the sample 
values in five groups). Comparing, the distribution for each age class, to the marginal 
distribution by cluster, we notice that younger individuals are somewhat underrepresented in 
Cluster 1 and overrepresented in Cluster 3 (which is the cluster most favourable to Europe 
and EU) and Clusters 5 and 6, while older individuals (especially with more than 65 years) 
are overrepresented in Cluster 1 and underrepresented in Clusters 3, 5 and 6. Generally, 
however, it seems that age has not too much influence on identification.  
Regarding education, clearer patterns emerge: individuals with a tertiary education have a 
higher probability than average to be allocated in Cluster 3 and 4 (higher level of 
identification and positive attitude toward EU institutions) and even to Cluster 1 (strongly 
identify with Europe but critics with EU institution), while a lower than average probability 
to be classified in Cluster 2, 5 and 6 (all of them characterised by a lower level of 
identification). On the contrary, people with the lowest level of education are much more 
underrepresented in clusters 3 and 4 and overrepresented in Cluster 2, which is the cluster of 
citizens that do not identify with Europe and the most critics against the EU.  
A similar pattern emerges for income level: generally, individuals with high income are most 
likely than average to be included in Cluster 3 and 1 and less likely in Cluster 2, while 
individuals with a low level of income are more likely to be classified in Cluster 2 and less in 
Clusters 3 and 4.  
We report also other individual characteristics that are not considered in the final model: 
although they do not concur directly to determine the classification they can be used to 
describe the clusters, as in standard “multivariate cluster analysis”.  
As for the composition by sex, we can see that there is no a clear divide by gender. About 
occupational status, we notice that unemployed are over-represented in Cluster 2 and under-
represented in Cluster 3, 4 and 1. Students and trainees are more represented in Clusters 3, 4 
and 5, and less in Clusters 2 and 1. 
Finally, we consider whether people are satisfied with the economic situation in the region at 
the time of the survey. Indeed, people unsatisfied with the economic situation are over-
represented in Cluster 2 and underrepresented in Cluster 4 and 1; the contrary happens for 
satisfied people.  
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In conclusion, despite it is possible to identify some influence of individual characteristics on 
the level of identification and citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, in general we cannot 
recognise a strong dependence of identification on demographic or socio-economic 
characteristics. 
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Table 9. Conditional probabilities of  X𝑖𝑗 for individual level covariates: P(X = t|𝐙p = z). 
 Cluster1 
Disappointend 
pro- Europe 
Cluster2 
EU Deniers 
Cluster3 
Confident 
Europeans 
Cluster4 
Wary pro-
Europe 
Cluster5 
Disaffected 
Europeans 
Cluster6 
Wary Cons- 
Europe 
       
Overall 0.273 0.197 0.175 0.150 0.106 0.100 
       
Age (years)      
18-33 0.231 0.178 0.189 0.150 0.127 0.125 
33-44 0.262 0.190 0.195 0.139 0.107 0.107 
45-55 0.288 0.208 0.166 0.143 0.103 0.092 
56-65 0.278 0.209 0.166 0.159 0.101 0.087 
More than 65 0.303 0.202 0.161 0.156 0.091 0.088 
       
Education      
Primary and 
lower secondary 
0.261 0.245 0.116 0.131 0.124 0.123 
High secondary 0.251 0.213 0.177 0.146 0.105 0.109 
Degree and PhD 0.297 0.161 0.202 0.161 0.098 0.081 
       
Income       
Low 0.245 0.217 0.156 0.142 0.113 0.127 
Medium 0.249 0.215 0.166 0.160 0.110 0.101 
High 0.312 0.170 0.192 0.149 0.096 0.081 
DK/R 0.285 0.180 0.209 0.141 0.105 0.080 
       
Not Included in the Model 
Gender       
Male 0.263 0.2049 0.1732 0.1517 0.1069 0.1002 
Female 0.2822 0.1896 0.1772 0.1473 0.1042 0.0995 
       
Occupation       
Employed 0.2709 0.1912 0.1827 0.1457 0.1071 0.1023 
Unemployed 0.2314 0.2544 0.1346 0.1386 0.1147 0.1263 
Housewife, 
Pensioner, 
Retired, Other 
0.2878 0.2046 0.1646 0.1555 0.097 0.0905 
Student, Trainee 0.2397 0.1352 0.2159 0.1695 0.1383 0.1014 
       
Satisfied with economic situation 
Not satisfied 0.2375 0.238 0.1745 0.1327 0.1068 0.1105 
Satisfied 0.2997 0.1658 0.1758 0.1623 0.1046 0.0917 
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We can replicate the analysis considering also the membership probabilities (for individual 
level and group-level latent variables) by specific values of the context covariates at regional 
level (Table 10 and Table 11 respectively).  
The wealth of regions where people live have some influence on the probability to be 
classified in different clusters. Cluster 1 is over-represented in regions with high GDP and 
low unemployment. Cluster 3 and 4 are overrepresented in poorest regions and 
underrepresented in regions with high levels of GDP and low level of unemployment. Cluster 
2, the most adverse to EU project, are underrepresented in the poorest regions and 
overrepresented in richest regions while the level of unemployment in the region does not 
seem to influence too much. Cluster 6 is more likely present in very poor regions and high 
unemployment, on the contrary of Cluster 5 that is underrepresented in the same regions. 
Looking at the effect of absorption rate, that is a proxy of the regions’ effectiveness and 
efficiency in programming and implementing Cohesion Policy, not a clear pattern can be 
observed, apart for Clusters 1 and 3. People living in regions with high values of the rate are 
most likely assigned to Cluster 1 and somewhat to Clusters 4 and 6, while people living in 
regions with low values (less efficient) are more likely assigned to Cluster 3.  
The amount of Structural Fund received in the region seems to be more influencing: people 
living in regions receiving more funding (typically regions targeted as “Convergence 
Objective”) are more likely classified in Clusters 3 and 4 (typically with strong identification 
and positive attitude toward EU); on the contrary, people living in regions where EU funding 
is low are more likely to be in Clusters 1 (they strongly identify but they do not trust EU), in 
Cluster 2 (do not identify and do not trust EU), and 5 (they identify more with their country, 
and do not evaluate much the effectiveness of EU in solving problems).  
The last variable reported in the table regards the Quality of Institution Index. It is not 
included in the final model as an active covariate (i.e. it does not affect the membership 
probabilities) because it was highly correlated with GDP and SF expenses; at the same time, 
we already account for perceived corruption among the manifest variables. However, we can 
describe each cluster by this variable too in order to check the correspondence with this 
indicator at regional level. In correspondence to high values of the index (high institutional 
quality in the region), individuals have a higher chance to be classified in Cluster 1, 2 and 5: 
although different for the level of identifications, these clusters have in common people 
perception of high level of corruption in EU institutions and more trust in their national 
governments. On the contrary, in correspondence of low and intermediate levels of this 
indicator, people more likely are classified in Clusters 3 and 4, both with high level of 
identification, even if individuals in Cluster 4 are critics about corruption in EU, and have 
somewhat higher chance to be classified in Cluster 6 too that have a lower level of 
identification with EU but they trust EU institutions regarding corruption.   
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Table 10. Conditional probabilities of Xij for contextual level covariates: P(X = t|𝐙p = z) 
 Cluster1 
Disappointend 
pro- Europe 
Cluster2 
EU Deniers 
Cluster3 
Confident 
Europeans 
Cluster4 
Wary pro-
Europe 
Cluster5 
Disaffected 
Europeans 
Cluster6 
Wary Cons- 
Europe 
Overall 0.2727 0.1972 0.1752 0.1495 0.1056 0.0999 
Covariates       
GDP       
0-37 0.194 0.120 0.302 0.169 0.074 0.141 
37-59 0.248 0.182 0.191 0.174 0.101 0.105 
59-97 0.248 0.210 0.175 0.149 0.103 0.116 
97-118 0.302 0.273 0.118 0.121 0.122 0.065 
More than 118 0.375 0.203 0.088 0.133 0.129 0.073 
Unemployment rate       
0-5.5 0.350 0.197 0.126 0.136 0.112 0.079 
5.5-8 0.285 0.229 0.134 0.127 0.136 0.090 
8-9.5 0.281 0.187 0.191 0.156 0.097 0.088 
9.5-14 0.240 0.193 0.219 0.130 0.102 0.117 
more than 14 0.205 0.179 0.211 0.199 0.080 0.127 
Absorption rate       
0-0.5 0.224 0.188 0.234 0.133 0.097 0.124 
0.5-0.6 0.272 0.221 0.164 0.166 0.100 0.077 
0.6-0.65 0.315 0.195 0.175 0.135 0.103 0.076 
0.65-0.78 0.316 0.189 0.146 0.145 0.113 0.091 
more than 0.78 0.232 0.194 0.158 0.170 0.115 0.132 
SF per capita       
0-108 0.314 0.232 0.120 0.125 0.126 0.083 
108-215 0.310 0.248 0.118 0.126 0.121 0.077 
215-935 0.239 0.160 0.228 0.151 0.100 0.123 
935-2059 0.267 0.166 0.203 0.161 0.083 0.119 
More than 2059 0.235 0.180 0.207 0.183 0.097 0.099 
Not included in the model       
Quality of institution Index 
0-36 0.228 0.192 0.243 0.126 0.092 0.119 
36-42 0.250 0.161 0.232 0.187 0.078 0.092 
42-56 0.216 0.181 0.204 0.171 0.099 0.128 
56-66 0.318 0.228 0.119 0.132 0.125 0.078 
More than 66 0.353 0.223 0.077 0.131 0.133 0.083 
 
The probability that a region belongs to a group identified by a particular latent class at level-
2 is modelled to depend on its socio-economic characteristics as well. Table 11 shows the 
group-level class membership probabilities by the levels of each contextual covariate. 
The influence of the level of GDP on group-level membership probabilities is quite evident: 
regions with higher level of GDP than the European average are overrepresented in Group 1 
“Lower EU identification” and Group 3 “Medium-high EU identification – Critics”; on the 
contrary, regions with lower value of GDP than EU average are more likely to be classified in 
Group 2 “High EU identification”; in Group 4 “Low EU identification – Skeptical” are more 
likely classified the regions with a level of GDP below 50-60% of the EU average.  
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Regarding the unemployment rate, regions with smaller rates are overrepresented in Group 3 
(Identify but Critics) and underrepresented in Group 2 (High identification) and Group 4 
(Weak identification and skeptical), in particular regions with very high unemployment rate 
are more likely classified in Group 2 (High Identification and Trust in EU). Group 1 (Weak 
identification) have instead a mixed composition when considering unemployment rate, 
because there are regions with either low and high unemployment rate, the only exception is 
the underrepresentation in this group of regions with very high unemployment rate (on the 
contrary of Group 4).  
As for the influence of the absorption rate, its effect is not so clear cut (as we already notice 
in the case of individual cluster membership): region with very low values of absorption rate 
are overrepresented in Group 2 and Group 4 that have very different identification level and 
trust in EU, and underrepresented in Group 1 and Group 3 (both critics toward EU with 
regards to effectiveness and corruption, though with a different level of identification). 
However in group 2 are overrepresented regions with very high absorption rate as well; 
nevertheless, most of the regions with medium-high values of the absorption rate are more 
likely classified in Group 1 and Group 3.  
Regions that receive more financial funding from EU are most likely classified in Group 2 
and Group 4, while regions that receive lower amount of funding from EU are 
overrepresented in Group 1 and Group 3. This situation reflects what happens in the case of 
GDP: richest regions are receiving less financial funding from EU hence the groups are 
characterized by an opposite effect of the two covariates.  
Finally, even if it has not a direct influence on regions’ membership probabilities, we look at 
the distribution across groups by different levels of the EQI indicator. In this case as well, the 
picture emerging characterize Group 1 and Group 3 as composed more likely by regions with 
high level of institutional quality, while the regions with lower levels of the EQI index are 
more likely included in Group 2 and Group 4. 
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Table 11. Conditional probabilities of Wj for contextual covariates: P̂(W = m|Zq
g
= z) 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Overall 0.386 0.322 0.151 0.142 
Covariates     
GDP     
0-37 0.051 0.739 0.016 0.194 
37-59 0.008 0.615 0.061 0.317 
59-97 0.361 0.403 0.086 0.151 
97-118 0.687 0.069 0.137 0.107 
More than 118 0.515 0.003 0.418 0.064 
Unemployment rate     
0-5.5 0.387 0.091 0.457 0.065 
5.5-8 0.540 0.120 0.233 0.107 
8-9.5 0.383 0.428 0.028 0.161 
9.5-14 0.404 0.411 0.010 0.174 
more than 14 0.103 0.677 0.000 0.220 
Absorption rate     
0-0.5 0.198 0.451 0.033 0.318 
0.5-0.6 0.421 0.259 0.104 0.216 
0.6-0.65 0.448 0.309 0.183 0.060 
0.65-0.78 0.433 0.225 0.267 0.076 
more than 78 0.390 0.417 0.161 0.032 
SF per capita     
0-108 0.461 0.171 0.316 0.052 
108-215 0.679 0.116 0.130 0.075 
215-935 0.371 0.350 0.131 0.148 
935-2059 0.051 0.687 0.080 0.182 
More than 2059 0.001 0.443 0.055 0.501 
Quality of institution Index     
0-36 0.226 0.537 0.020 0.216 
36-42 0.147 0.474 0.039 0.340 
42-56 0.164 0.664 0.034 0.138 
56-66 0.549 0.175 0.188 0.088 
More than 66 0.606 0.009 0.360 0.026 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this deliverable we present the characteristics, specification and results of the novel 
IdentEU probabilistic model. IdentEU represents the first attempt to classify EU citizens and 
regions according to their level of identification with the European project. 
IdentEU is a Latent Class (LC) model that allows to cluster citizens and regions according to 
their different patterns of identification with Europe and the European project. In particular, 
through latent categorical variables we can account for the three main dimensions at the base 
of the concept of individual identification, i.e., “awareness”, “evaluation” and “attachment” 
(see section 2.1.2), and for spatial characteristics of European identity and identification 
discussed in D5.1, D2.2, D2.3. Then, we consider also the influence of individual 
characteristics and regional context variables. Thus, IdentEU contributes to advance our 
understanding and the assessment of identification and of the factors that influence people's 
attitudes toward the EU and European project, both at individual and regional level. 
The novel IdentEU model identifies six clusters of respondent types at the individual level: 
three clusters include individuals who strongly identify with the European project (Clusters 3, 
4, 1), while three clusters include individuals who mostly don’t identify with the European 
project (Clusters 2, 5 and 6). The probability of belonging to the three Clusters 3, 4 and 1 is 
around 60%. In contrast, the probability of belonging to Clusters 2, 5 e 6, i.e. people who 
identify less with the European project, is around 40%.  
The clusters are heterogeneous with regard to socio-economic and political dimensions, such 
as the national vs EU identification, the evaluation of the EU membership and its 
effectiveness, the level of citizens’ awareness of the existence of the Cohesion Policy and the 
agreement on its solidarity value, the trust in EU institutions and the perceived level of 
corruption.  
In particular, at one of the extremes of this classification, we can identify the “Confident 
Europeans” (Cluster 3), who adhere to the EU values, identify themselves as European, and 
trust the EU institutions because of their lower perceived level of corruption, even if they 
consider the action of the European Union to be less effective than that of national 
governments.  
At the other extreme, we identify the “EU Deniers” (Cluster 2) characterized by the most 
negative attitude toward the EU, due to the perception of low effectiveness in solving 
problems at regional or national level, the presence of widespread corruption within the EU 
institutions (similar or higher than in national institutions), and the negative connotation of 
the EU membership. In addition, the support to the Cohesion Policy and GDP redistribution 
to poorest regions in the EU is the lowest among the identified clusters. Nevertheless, Cluster 
2 also shows the lowest active participation in the political debate and elections. 
Moving to the identification of groups at the regional level, we see a similarity, with regard to 
the determinants of identification, with the clusters identified at the individual level.  
In particular, Group 4 “Low EU identification – Skeptical” – and Group 1 “Lower EU 
identification” - are characterized by the citizens' worst attitude toward the EU membership 
of their countries, while Group 2 “High EU identification” represents the group of regions 
with the highest level of identification with Europe, where people have a higher level of trust 
and appreciation for EU institution. 
It emerges that the UK regions and North Ireland, all the French regions, Netherland, Sweden 
and Estonia are more likely to be classified in Group 1, which together with regions 
belonging to Group 4 (which is mostly composed by Italian and Hungarian regions) are 
characterized by lower levels of identification and higher critical views of EU institutions. 
Despite sharing criticism towards institutions, most of the German and Austrian regions 
strongly identify with EU and belong to Group 3 "Medium-high EU identification – 
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Critics". Several of the Eastern European regions belong to Group 2 “High EU 
identification” and show the highest level of identification with Europe, trust the EU and 
considers it more effective and less corrupt than their national governments.  
The model results show that the membership into individual latent classes is influenced to 
some extent by individual demographic or socio-economic characteristics. Indeed, education 
has a certain influence on citizens’ identification with the EU. In contrast, the age dimension 
has limited influence. In particular, individuals with a tertiary education have a higher 
probability to be allocated in clusters showing high level of identification and positive 
attitude toward EU institutions (i.e. Clusters 3, 4 and 1). At the opposite, citizens with the 
lowest level of education are overrepresented in Cluster 2, which is the cluster that identify 
weakly with Europe and the most critics against the EU. A similar pattern emerges for 
income level, in so far individuals with high income are most likely than average to be 
included in Cluster 3 and 1 and less likely in Cluster 2, while low-income individuals are 
more likely to be classified in Cluster 2. 
In conclusion, we find that, despite being possible to identify some influence of individual 
characteristics on the level of identification and citizens’ attitudes toward the EU, in general 
we cannot recognise a very strong dependence of identification on demographic or socio-
economic characteristics of individuals. 
A similar conclusion regards the influence of contextual covariates in predicting the regions’ 
membership to groups with different pattern of identification: 20%  of the regions  switch 
their  group membership after accounting for the individuals' responses from the survey, 
whose results create a “new” map of EU identity (section 4.4).  
The core of the Northern countries belonging to the EU, with the exception of Estonia 
(among the recent EU members), shows regions whose citizens identify themselves with the 
EU project at a lower extent than the others. In fact, all regions in the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland, all French regions, the Netherlands, Sweden and Estonia are more likely to 
be classified in Group 1, which is characterized by a lower level of identification and the 
most critical positions towards EU institutions. 
Moreover, a relevant number of regions, mostly from Germany and Austria, are classified in 
a group that identify with the EU, even if they are critics about some aspects (Group 3). In 
addition, most of Eastern Europe regions (except regions from Hungary) and all Spanish 
regions have the highest level of identification with Europe and trust the EU for both its 
effectiveness and absence of corruption (Group 2). 
Taking into account the influence of contextual covariates (absorption rate, amount of EU 
structural funds per capita and level of quality of institutions) we note that: absorption rate is 
higher in regions with a higher level quality of institution (EQI indicator) but the amount of 
structural funds per capita received from these regions (generally Competitiveness Objective) 
is lower. Most regions with these characteristics are classified in Group 1 “Lower EU 
Identification”, therefore adhesion to the EU project is not led by Cohesion Policy. 
In the Convergence Objective regions, where the absorption rate is lower as well as the 
institutional quality, the amount of funds is high, most of these regions are classified in 
Group 2 “High EU identification” and citizens better perceive the benefits of the Cohesion 
Policy and identify more with the EU. 
However, we see that regions that can be considered similar with respect to contextual 
characteristics may have quite different level of identification and attitudes toward EU: as 
Group 2 and Group 4 that have similar characteristics and different pattern of identification, 
as well as Group1 and Group3. 
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The Northern Italian regions are quite a peculiar case. Regardless of the variety of the social 
and economic contexts they live in, the citizens of Northern Italian regions share with the 
southern regions in Italy a common mistrust towards institutions, both national and European, 
and consider Italy's adhesion to the EU a bad thing for their country (Group 4). In fact, most 
of them are initially placed in Group 1 together with French and North-European regions, 
where citizens show a relatively lower identification with the European Union but still 
considers EU membership in a more favourable manner. However, after considering 
individual responses, they were classified in Group 4, which is  characterized by mistrust 
towards all institutions. 
Our results highlight another crucial aspect: the role of the communication of the Cohesion 
Policy, whose importance can be indirectly deduced by looking at the regions' change of 
groups. How are perceptions of EU Cohesion Policy formed at individual level? If our 
analysis show that these are seemingly independent from the social and economic contexts 
(sections 4.4 and 4.5.), then there might be a link with the discourse about Cohesion Policy 
built by the media. This relationship will be further investigated within the PERCEIVE 
project in D3.4, that will deal with the communication of Cohesion Policy. 
The relevance of the three dimensions “Awareness” (in terms of the EU Cohesion Policy and 
its local benefit), “Evaluation” (in terms of perceived effectiveness of political institutions 
and benefits of EU membership) and “Attachment” (participation in the election and support 
to the redistributive role of the EU), is confirmed in the analysis of the nine regional case 
studies, as they play a fundamental role in determining a region's group membership. The 
awareness of EU Cohesion Policy is highest in Group 2 regions Sud-Est (RO), Dolnoslaskie 
and Warminsko-Mazurskie (PL) and Extremadura (ES), and lowest in Group 1 “Lower EU 
identification” regions Essex (UK) and Norra Mellansverige (SE).  
“Attachment” follows an analogue pattern. Indeed, citizens of the regions belonging to Group 
2 are those who are most likely to have voted in both last elections for the European 
parliament, and who show a higher level of support for the EU redistributive policy.  
The “Evaluation” dimension, on the other hand, is the least coherent of the three. Indeed 
Group 2 have the highest probability of finding citizens who consider the EU to be effective 
and less affected by corruption than their national institutions but, in the other groups, this 
dimension is more ambiguous.  
The IdentEU results help to shed light on the patterns of EU individual and regional 
identification with the European project, as well as their drivers. In particular, our results are 
consistent with the latest tendencies emerged in the EU, i.e. the growing Euro-Skepticism 
that boomed with the Brexit referendum in the UK and was remarked by the results of the 
recent elections in France, Hungary, Italy. Indeed, it emerges that the most hostile regions to 
the EU project are somehow the richest ones. On the other hand, we find a high level of trust 
in EU institutions, in its transparency and effectiveness in Central and Eastern European 
countries (Hungary excluded), which instead perceive high internal level of corruption (see 
for instance the recent street protests in Romania and Poland).  
The influencing variables that mostly affect citizens and regions’ identification with the 
European project are those currently driving the discussion on the challenges for reforming 
the EU, i.e. trust in the EU institutions, the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy and 
spending, and the level of corruption. Finally, the consequences of globalization on lower 
skilled, lower educated and poorer workers affect citizens’ identification with the European 
project in a negative way. Indeed, workers left worse off from the globalization show lower 
trust and identification with the EU institutions. 
These issues are relevant at the light of three main challenges that affected the EU socio-
economic development path in the last decade, i.e. the 2008 financial crisis, the globalization 
process, and Brexit. 
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First, the financial crisis led to a persisting lack of aggregate demand in most European 
countries, thus worsening the living conditions of the lower and middle-income classes, in 
particular in Southern Europe, where governments could not invest in the economic recovery 
as needed, being subject to tight fiscal and budgetary constraints (e.g. the fiscal compact). 
Then, this, in turn, might have contributed to accrue the gap in socio-economic conditions, 
and the trade imbalances, between the EU richer regions and the EU convergence regions.  
The negative effects of the financial crisis on citizens’ perception and identification with the 
European project (see D1.1 of the PERCEIVE project) emerged also in the focus group 
organized with the Local Managing Authorities within the PERCEIVE project, in particular 
in Emilia-Romagna, which is one of the best economic performing regions in Italy (see 
Brasili ea. 2017). 
Second, the process of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, known 
as Brexit, which started after the referendum in June 2016, increasingly led citizens (and 
several political parties) to question the role of the European institutions. This, in turn, 
contributed to increase the mistrust into the European project of the losers of the 
globalization and financial crisis, and to fuel feelings of Euro-skepticism, which eventually 
turn into anti-EU and anti-establishment votes in national elections in several EU member 
states (see France, Germany and Italy). 
Third, there is growing concern that a mismanaged process of globalization contributed to 
decrease EU citizens’ trust in the EU, as a consequence of increased inequality across 
households and sector, jobs’ loss or delocalization, lower wages’ purchasing power and 
booming profits on financial markets (Stiglitz, 2017; Tridico 2017). In a recent Special 
Eurobarometer Report, 38% of EU respondents considered globalization as a threat to 
employment and companies in their country, and 63% agreed that globalization increases 
social inequalities (Special Eurobarometer 461, 2017). In addition, the Brexit vote has been 
considered as a reaction to UK citizens’ perception of the EU failure to protect its population 
from the socio-economic challenges emerged during globalization (Elliott 2016).  
These insights, in particular as regards the impact of growing inequality on the identification 
with the EU project, are consistent with the results of D2.2, which clarified that identification 
with Europe increases with individuals’ support to income redistribution and with trust. In 
addition, D2.3’s results showed that countries with higher levels of the Composite Index of 
European Identity are those who do not need a massive support to redistribution policies and 
have high level of trust in their institutions. 
Therefore, the IdentEU model not only represents an advancement on the modelling state of 
the art for academics, but its results also contribute to fill a major knowledge gap and to 
explain the drivers of the current instability and the critical phase of the EU to institutions, 
policy makers and practitioners at both the EU and regional level. In the ongoing debate on 
the need to reform EU institutions to increase its transparency and accountability to the EU 
citizens, our results provide a precious snapshot of EU citizens and regions’ perception of the 
European project, and their main sources of discontent. 
The results obtained through the model confirm the need to partially redirect the Cohesion 
Policy from the placed based approach to the improvement of citizens' wellbeing, and the 
need to foster the integration of political interventions. This result clearly emerged from the 
practitioners' point of view and the communication of the Cohesion Policy carried out in the 
focus groups (D1.1). 
With respect to further advancements of the PERCEIVE project, the results of the IdentEU 
model will be used as inputs for i) D2.5, as regards the analysis of regional disparities in 
citizens' identification with the European project, and their evolution over time, and ii) D6.2-
d, i.e. the calibration of the System Dynamics computer model on empirical data in order to 
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understand the extent to which simulated behaviours are plausible in the light of available 
empirical evidence.  
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7. Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1. Complementarities between D2.4 and the other PERCEIVE deliverables 
Deliverable  WP  Title Focus Complementarity (input/putput) 
D1.1 
(UNIBO) 
WP1 Report on regional 
case-studies. 
Focus groups with 
Local Managing 
Authorities. 
Input: insights for selection of model’s 
clusters and contextualization of IdentEU 
model’s results. 
D1.2 
(UGOT) 
WP1 Dataset built from the 
survey at citizen level 
for the case-studies 
regions and report with 
qualitative results. 
PERCEIVE survey 
and PERCEIVE EU 
Regional Dataset. 
Input: data from the PERCEIVE Survey at 
the individual level, and at the regional 
level from the PERCEIVE’s EU Regional 
Dataset (including indicators of the 
Cohesion Policy in each region) are used 
to build the IdentEU probabilistic model. 
D2.2 
(UBO) 
WP2 Mapping the 
determinants of EU 
citizens’ perception and 
identification. 
Analysis of the 
determinants of 
citizens’ 
identification with 
the EU. 
Input: use of the results on citizens’ 
identification with the EU project, 
awareness and perception of the Cohesion 
policies to select the models’ variables. 
D2.3 
(UBO) 
WP2 Report on the 
construction of the CIEI 
indicator. 
Development of the 
Composite Index of 
European Identity. 
Input: use of the Composite Index of 
European Identity in the model 
development. 
D5.1 
(WU, 
UNIBO) 
WP5 Short contribution to be 
used in dissemination 
events about the 
empirical relevance of a 
social constructivist and 
discursive approach to 
EU identity emergence 
and integration. 
Framework of 
analysis and the 
literature review on 
the definition and the 
determinants of 
European identity.  
Input: determinants of European identity 
and identification with the EU to inform 
the selection of the model’s variables. 
D2.5 (UBO, 
UNIBO) 
WP2 Analysis of regional 
disparities in EU 
citizens’ identification 
and its evolution over 
time. 
Identification of 
regional patters of 
disparities in citizens' 
identification with 
the EU project with 
spatial analyses. 
Output: results of the IdentEU model as 
regards the drivers of citizens and regions’ 
identification with the EU. 
D2.6 
(UNIBO, 
IEA, IAFE-
NRI, UB, 
PBS, WU, 
BAM! 
 
WP6 Quantitative model 
building and validation 
Calibration of the 
System Dynamics 
computer model on 
empirical data in 
order to understand 
the extent to which 
simulated behaviours 
are plausible in the 
light of available 
empirical evidence. 
Output: results of the IdentEU model in 
terms of variables influencing citizens and 
regions’ identification with the EU. 
D2.4 uses inputs from D1.1, D.1.2, D2.2, D2.3, D5.1 to identify the determinants of identity and identification 
with the EU to be quantified and assessed by IdentEU. In contrast, IdentEU results (in particular on the drivers 
of citizens and regions’ identification with the EU) feed into D2.5 and D2.6d. 
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Table A.2. Definition of indicators, individual covariates and contextual variables 
Variable Description Values 
 
Indicators (manifest variables) 
Awareness of EU policies Q1. Have you ever heard about the following 
EU policies? (EU Cohesion Policy; EU 
Regional Policy; EU Structural Funds; any EU 
funded project in your region or area) 
0 None of these 
1 Only local project 
2 At least one among EU CP, 
EU RP, EU SF 
Benefits from EU policies Q3. Have you ever benefited in your daily life 
from any project funded by the EU? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
99 Don’t Know/RF 
Identification with Europe 
(Q9_3) 
 
Q9. On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being ‘I don’t 
identify at all’ and ‘10’ being “I identify very 
strongly”, how strongly you identify yourself 
with the following:  
Q9_1: Your region;  
Q9_2: Your country;  
Q9_3: Europe 
1 Not much (0-3) 
2 Somewhat strongly (4-6) 
3 Strongly (7-10) 
Identification with Europe 
vs Country 
Comparing Q9_3 to Q9_1  1 Less  
2 Equal 
3 More 
Identification with Europe 
vs Region 
Comparing Q9_3 to Q9_2 1 Less 
2 Equal 
3 More 
Effectiveness of EU (Q5_1) Q5. How effective do you think the following 
institutions will be at dealing with the biggest 
problem in your region?  
Q5_1:The EU;  
Q5_2: National governing institutions;  
Q5_3: Regional/local Institutions 
1 Not very effective 
2 Somewhat effective 
3 Very effective 
Effectiveness of EU vs 
National governing 
institutions 
Comparing Q5_1 to Q5_2 1 Less 
2 Equal 
3 More 
Effectiveness of EU vs 
regional/local governing 
institutions 
Comparing Q5_1 to Q5_3 1 Less than EU 
2 Equal to EU 
3 More than EU 
Evaluation of EU 
membership 
Q8. In general, do you think that (YOUR 
COUNTRY’S) EU membership is a good thing, 
a bad thing, neither good nor bad? 
1 Good 
0 Bad / Neither good or bad/ 
Not sure 
Corruption in EU (Q16_1) Q16. On a 0-10 scale, with ‘0’ being that ‘there 
is no corruption’ and ‘10’ being that corruption 
is widespread, how would you rate:  
Q16_1: The European union;  
Q16_2: The national government;  
Q16_3: The region/local government?  
1 Low (0-3) 
2 Medium (4-6) 
3 High (7-10) 
Corruption in EU vs 
National government 
Comparing Q16_1 to Q16_2 1 Less 
2 Equal 
3 More 
Corruption in EU vs 
regional/local government 
Comparing Q16_1 to Q16_3 1 Less 
2 Equal 
3 More 
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Table A.2. (Continue) 
Variable Description Values 
Indicators   
Vote in the EU elections Q7. Have you voted in either of the last two EU 
parliamentary elections?  
0 Neither 
1 Once 
3 Both 
999 Don’t know/RF 
Support Q20: In your opinion, the EU should continue 
this policy, where wealthier countries contribute 
more, and poorer EU regions receive more 
funding? 
1 – Agree;  
2 – Disagree;  
3 – D/K 
Individual Covariates 
Gender Gender 1 Male 
2 Female 
Age Age in years Continuous 
Education Level of education 1 - Up to first level secondary 
2 - High school 
3 - Degree and PhD 
Level of income Net income per month (after taxes) 1 - Low 
2 - Medium 
3 - High 
Occupation Occupational status 1 - Employee 
2 – unemployed 
3 - Housewife, pensioner, 
retired, Other 
4 Students, trainee 
Context covariates (at regional level) 
GDP_14 GDP per inhabitant in Euro at 2014 as 
percentage of EU average 
Numerical value 
Eqi_100 European Index of Institutional Quality at 2013 
(Normalized) 
Numerical value (0-100) 
Abs_13 Absorption rate of SF expenditures: ratio of SF 
expenditures up to 2013 to the SF allocation in 
the 2007-2013 period 
Numerical value (0-1) 
SFtot_pc Total expenditures financed by Structural Fund 
in years 2007-13 divided by the average 
population in a region in the period 2007-13 
Numerical value (euros) 
Unold14 Unemployment rate: population 20-64 years Numerical value 
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A.3. Bic statistics and number of parameter for models with T individual clusters and M 
regions’ groups 
 
 Regions' Group 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Individual 
Clusters 
BIC Npar BIC Npar BIC Npar BIC Npar BIC Npar 
1 298870 22 298108 28 298010 34 297992 40 297997 46 
2 284111 49 283256 56 283059 63 282986 70 282965 77 
3 279016 76 277771 84 277307 92 277058 100 277013 108 
4 276010 103 274491 112 274243 121 273666 130 273458 139 
5 273440 130 271812 140 271693 150 271284 160 271367 170 
6 271789 157 269925 168 269578 179 269301 190 268971 201 
7 270153 184 268337 196 268481 208 268228 220 267702 232 
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Table A.4. Prior cluster membership probabilities  P( W= m| Z) , and posterior cluster 
membership probabilities P( W= m| Y Z)  with the respective modal assignment for the 
regions. 
 Posterior Probability Model Probability 
Region Modal 1 2 3 4 Modal 1 2 3 4 
           
DE1 - Baden-Württemberg 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.28 0.00 0.72 0.00 
DE2 - Bayern 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.20 0.00 0.79 0.00 
DE3 - Berlin 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1 0.80 0.04 0.04 0.12 
DE4 - Brandenburg 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.29 0.07 0.62 0.03 
DE5 - Bremen 3 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.00 3 0.41 0.00 0.55 0.04 
DE6 - Hamburg 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.20 0.00 0.79 0.02 
DE7 - Hessen 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.00 
DE8 - Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
1 0.74 0.00 0.26 0.00 2 0.34 0.39 0.19 0.08 
DE9 - Niedersachsen 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1 0.53 0.00 0.47 0.01 
DEA - Nordrhein-Westfalen 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1 0.70 0.00 0.28 0.01 
DEB - Rheinland-Pfalz 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.49 0.00 0.51 0.00 
DEC - Saarland 3 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.00 1 0.60 0.00 0.39 0.01 
DED - Sachsen 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.22 0.12 0.38 0.28 
DEE - Sachsen-Anhalt 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2 0.22 0.30 0.24 0.24 
DEF - Schleswig-Holstein 3 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 1 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.00 
DEG - Thüringen 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.20 0.04 0.74 0.02 
SE11-Stockholm 1 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 1 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.01 
SE21-Småland med örarna 1 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 1 0.81 0.00 0.17 0.02 
SE31-Norra Mellansverige 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.61 0.00 0.37 0.02 
AT11 - Burgenland 3 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 3 0.31 0.01 0.68 0.00 
AT12 - Niederöstrerreich 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.01 
AT13 - Wien 1 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 1 0.55 0.00 0.02 0.42 
AT21 - Kärnten 1 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.11 1 0.74 0.01 0.22 0.03 
AT22 - Steiermark 3 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.00 1 0.56 0.00 0.43 0.00 
AT31 - Oberösterreich 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.41 0.00 0.58 0.01 
AT32 - Salzburg 3 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 3 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.00 
AT33 - Tirol 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3 0.29 0.00 0.70 0.01 
AT34 - Voralberg 3 0.11 0.00 0.89 0.00 3 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.00 
BG31-Severozapaden 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.01 
BG32-Severen centralen 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.06 0.93 0.00 0.01 
BG33-Severoiztochen 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.01 
BG34-Ugoiztochen 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 2 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.00 
BG41-Ugozapaden 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.52 0.47 0.00 0.01 
BG42-Uzhen centralen 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.10 0.89 0.00 0.00 
EE00 Estonia 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.50 0.35 0.14 
ES11 - Galicia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.11 
ES12 - Principado de 
Asturias 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.01 
ES13 - Cantabria 2 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.03 2 0.04 0.83 0.00 0.13 
ES21 - Pais Vasco 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.54 0.37 0.00 0.09 
ES22 - Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.39 0.36 0.00 0.25 
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ES23 - La Rioja 2 0.28 0.72 0.00 0.00 2 0.44 0.55 0.00 0.01 
ES24 - Aragón 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.05 0.66 0.00 0.29 
ES30 - Comunidad de 
Madrid 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.69 0.30 0.00 0.01 
ES41 - Castilla y León 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.03 0.92 0.00 0.05 
ES42 - Castilla-La Mancha 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
ES43 - Extremadura 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.04 
ES51 - Cataluña 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.13 0.74 0.00 0.13 
ES52 - Comunidad 
Valenciana 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.00 
ES53 - Illes Balears 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.12 0.82 0.00 0.06 
ES61 - Andalucia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.32 
ES62 - Región de Murcia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
ES70 - Canarias (ES) 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.07 
FR10 - Ile-de-France 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.68 0.00 0.08 0.24 
FR21 - Champagne-Ardenne 1 0.92 0.02 0.06 0.00 1 0.85 0.10 0.01 0.04 
FR22 - Picardie 1 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.00 1 0.59 0.25 0.00 0.15 
FR23 - Haute-Normandie 1 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.24 4 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.54 
FR24 - Centre 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.80 0.09 0.01 0.10 
FR25 - Basse-Normandie 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.82 0.07 0.03 0.08 
FR26 - Bourgogne 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.74 0.13 0.01 0.12 
FR30 - Nord - Pas-de-Calais 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.55 0.33 0.00 0.12 
FR41 - Lorraine 1 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.09 1 0.52 0.28 0.00 0.19 
FR42 - Alsace 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.10 1 0.72 0.06 0.01 0.21 
FR43 - Franche-Comte 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.76 0.16 0.01 0.07 
FR51 - Pays de la Loire 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.85 0.04 0.03 0.07 
FR52 - Bretagne 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.89 0.03 0.07 0.01 
FR53 - Poitou-Charentes 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.71 0.15 0.01 0.14 
FR61 - Aquitaine 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.86 0.06 0.03 0.06 
FR62 - Midi-Pyrenees 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.78 0.06 0.02 0.14 
FR63 - Limousin 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.83 0.11 0.02 0.04 
FR71 - Rhone-Alpes 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.92 0.01 0.05 0.01 
FR72 - Auvergne 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.84 0.05 0.07 0.04 
FR81 - Languedoc-
Roussillon 
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.07 
FR82 - Provence-Alpes-Cote 
d'Azur 
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.63 0.06 0.01 0.31 
FR83 - Corse 4 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.98 4 0.25 0.12 0.01 0.62 
HU10-Central Hungary 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.56 0.23 0.19 0.02 
HU21-Central Transdanubia 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.26 0.13 0.61 
HU22-Western 
Transdanubia 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.73 
HU23-Southern 
Transdanubia 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.64 
HU31-Northern Hungary 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 
HU32-Northern Great Plain 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.74 
HU33-Southern Great Plain  4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.77 
LV00-Latvia 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.19 
NL11-Groningen 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.63 0.00 0.36 0.00 
NL12-Friesland 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.87 0.01 0.13 0.00 
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NL13-Drenthe 1 0.75 0.00 0.24 0.00 1 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 
NL21-Overijssel 1 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 1 0.79 0.00 0.21 0.00 
NL22-Gelderland 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.77 0.00 0.22 0.00 
NL23-Flevoland 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 1 0.89 0.05 0.01 0.05 
NL31-Utrecht 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.58 0.00 0.38 0.04 
NL32-Noord-Holland 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.59 0.00 0.31 0.10 
NL33-Zuid-Holland 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.71 0.01 0.06 0.23 
NL34-Zeeland 1 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.00 1 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.00 
NL41-Noord-Brabant 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.00 
NL42-Limburg 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.83 0.00 0.16 0.00 
PL11 – Lodzkie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.15 
PL12 - Mazowieckie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.04 0.43 0.14 0.39 
PL21 - Malopolskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.85 0.01 0.13 
PL22 – Slaskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.11 
PL31 - Lubelskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.09 
PL32 - Podkarpackie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.07 
PL33 - Swietokrzyskie 2 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.01 2 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.04 
PL34 - Podlaskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.16 
PL41 - Wielkopolskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.03 0.78 0.06 0.13 
PL42 - Zachodniopomorskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.10 
PL43 - Lubuskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.02 0.89 0.03 0.06 
PL51 - Dolnoslaskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.14 
PL52 - Opolskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.83 0.02 0.14 
PL61 - Kujawsko-Pomorskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.11 
PL62 - Warminsko-
Mazurskie 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.09 
PL63 - Pomorskie 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.85 0.01 0.12 
RO11 -Nord-Vest 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.16 0.63 0.12 0.09 
RO12 –Centru 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.02 0.79 0.00 0.19 
RO21 -Nord-Est 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.11 0.76 0.05 0.08 
RO22 -Sud-Est 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.01 0.84 0.00 0.15 
RO31 -Sud-Muntenia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.02 0.85 0.00 0.12 
RO32 -Bucure?ti-Ilfov 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.79 
RO41 -Sud-Vest Oltenia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.05 0.85 0.01 0.09 
RO42 –Vest 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.15 0.65 0.07 0.13 
SK01 -Bratislava Region 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.20 0.01 0.29 0.49 
SK02 -Western Slovakia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.56 
SK03 -Central Slovakia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
SK04 -Eastern Slovakia 2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.36 
UKC - North East, England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.88 0.05 0.04 0.02 
UKD - North West, England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.72 0.01 0.27 0.00 
UKE - Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.85 0.02 0.11 0.02 
UKF - East Midlands, 
England 
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.78 0.01 0.20 0.01 
UKG - West Midlands, 
England 
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.86 0.02 0.09 0.03 
UKH - East of England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.68 0.00 0.32 0.01 
UKI - London, England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0.34 0.00 0.52 0.14 
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UKJ - South East, England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.01 
UKK - South West, England 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.50 0.00 0.49 0.00 
UKL – Wales 1 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.42 1 0.39 0.09 0.31 0.20 
UKM – Scotland 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.01 
UKN - Northern Ireland 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 1 0.75 0.02 0.21 0.01 
ITC1 - Piemonte 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.79 0.13 0.01 0.08 
ITC3 - Liguria 1 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.03 1 0.85 0.09 0.01 0.05 
ITC4 - Lombardia 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.02 
ITF1 - Abruzzo 1 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.05 1 0.70 0.27 0.00 0.02 
ITF3 - Campania 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.80 
ITF4 - Puglia 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.56 
ITF6 - Calabria 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.63 
ITG1 - Sicilia 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.51 
ITG2 - Sardegna 4 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99 2 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.33 
ITH1 - Trentino-Alto 
Adige/Südtirol 
1 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.06 3 0.40 0.00 0.58 0.01 
ITH3 - Veneto 4 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 1 0.87 0.02 0.06 0.05 
ITH4 - Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 1 0.92 0.02 0.06 0.01 
ITH5 - Emilia-Romagna 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.71 0.03 0.02 0.24 
ITI1 - Toscana 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.66 0.09 0.01 0.24 
ITI2 - Umbria 1 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.12 1 0.71 0.23 0.00 0.05 
ITI3 - Marche 1 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.36 1 0.85 0.10 0.01 0.04 
ITI4 - Lazio 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.51 0.10 0.00 0.39 
 
 
 
 
